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Local Defenses are view by many counterinsurgency strategists as an essential 
element in defeating an insurgency. Providing a population with a local defense 
organization will strongly support the government’s strategy of extending its security and 
control over the rural areas affected by insurgent organizations. However every 
insurgency is unique and demands a unique counterinsurgency strategy to be defeated. 
There always will be an important commonality: insurgent organizations need popular 
support to subsist. The final success of the government or the insurgents will be 
determined by the capacity of either both to win and retain the support among the rural 
population. 
  
The analysis of the four cases presented in this study clearly demonstrates each 
government’s approach to the insurgent problem, including the use of local defenses to 
protect rural populations from insurgent attacks and influence.  The organization of local-
defenses during the Malayan Emergency, the El Salvador’s Civil War, as well as the 
Vietnam War and the Terrorist Epoch in Peru proved to be a force multiplier for the 
government’s effort, at least during the time period in which they were effectively 
implemented. The contribution of this analysis is not that of providing a framework or 
recipe for strategists to implement this kind of organizations. Rather, the contribution of 
this study is on a set of variables to be considered when planning the implementation of 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
A. PURPOSE 
Separating the rebels from a local population is a key factor in negating the 
supply, support, and concealment that insurgencies seek to exploit in order to survive in 
their early stages.  In cases where the state has been able to defeat the insurgents, the 
focus of the state has been on isolating the insurgency from its popular base of support. 
Under this scheme, a mix of non-military programs properly integrated with military 
action, has allowed the state to gradually shift the balance from passive and non-support, 
to active popular support for the government against the insurgents. Though no real 
framework can be drawn about how to negate insurgent organizations which enjoy 
popular support; in this thesis we will argue that, despite the approach of each particular 
state, a strategy of organizing the population in local defenses needs to be included as an 
essential element for gaining the hearts and minds of the population, as well as extending 
the government’s control over the country. The contribution of this thesis will be to 
provide the reader with a set of variables to be considered when planning the 
implementation of local defense organizations. 
 
B. METHODOLOGY  
Case Study analysis is used in this thesis. The cases used are Malaya from 1948 to 
1960, El Salvador from 1979 to 1990, Vietnam from 1961 to 1973, and Peru from 1980 
to 1997. In each case, a brief description of both the preconditions in the country and the 
build-up phase of the insurgency is presented. Then the insurgency as well as 
counterinsurgency strategies will be addressed. Particular emphasis will be given to the 
study of the local defense units organized by the state in these four cases as part of the 
counterinsurgency strategy. In the following chapters, an in depth analysis and 
comparison of the local defense units will be made as to determine the critical variables 
involved in the implementation of these programs.  Finally, we will draw conclusions in 
order to present a frame of reference and considerations upon which to improve the 
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effectiveness of these organizations when needed to support a new counterinsurgency 
challenge. 
The case selection was based on three criteria: 1) Whether or not the states, 
affected by an insurgency, introduced the concept of local defenses as part of a strategy to 
separating the insurgency from its base of popular support. In two of the four cases 
selected – Vietnam and El Salvador - a strategy of local defenses did not play a key role 
in the resolution of the conflict; however, in each case it did prove its effectiveness in 
negating the insurgents of popular support in some areas and, to some degree, during the 
time period in which it was implemented; 2) Whether or not the insurgent organizations 
were politically and militarily organized and presented a real threat of overthrowing the 
established government; and 3) Whether or not the conflict was a protracted war between 
the state and the insurgents, extending for more than a decade, and  inflicting a great 
number of casualties and causing important economic loses. 
 
C. ORGANIZATION OF THESIS 
The Thesis is organized in VII Chapters. Chapters II to V analyze insurgencies in 
Malaya, Vietnam, El Salvador, and Peru, as well as the counterinsurgency strategy 
applied by the government in each of these countries; the main focus will be on the 
organization of local defense units. Chapter VI identifies and explains the variables 
involved in the success or failure of the local defense organizations in these four 
countries including geographic, timing, military, political, economic, and cultural 
considerations. Chapter VII will address the lessons learned in the organization of local 
defense units. This Chapter will also establish a set of general considerations to be 
observed when planning the use of local defenses to disrupt the relationship between an 
insurgency and population in the future. 
 
D. DEFINITIONS 
1. Popular Support 
The counterinsurgency experience of the last century has demonstrated that 
terrorist and guerrilla organizations, cannot subsist without popular support.  Despite 
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their ideological motivations, at one point in time and according to their goals and 
strategy, they will need to establish a close relationship with the local population. The 
need to obtain food, medical attention, and weapons, as well as concealment and new 
cadres, demands innovation in their approach in order to influence the population to their 
benefit. Mao Tse Tung, referring to the communist cause, observed; “because guerrilla 
warfare basically derives from the masses and is supported by them, it can neither exist 
nor flourish if it separates itself from their sympathies and cooperation” (Stubbs, 1989, p. 
2). In all of the cases presented in this study, the insurgents either by persuasive or 
coercive methods have tried to attain this goal. The state, however, has countered the 
threat in some measures and not always with the same effectiveness, by appealing to 
psychological operations, civic-actions, resettlements, and the use of local defenses. 
 
2. Local Defense 
Local defenses refers to community organizations specifically organized in rural 
areas were the control of the state is scarce to none. The organization of local defenses 
has not always been a strategy of the state to extend its control over the population. In 
many cases the local defenses have been the early initiative of indigenous communities in 
order to confront criminal acts and to establish order and control in their villages.  
Nevertheless, in the cases presented, the reorientation of these organizations on a 
territorial basis has been the initiative of each government to help the isolated populations 
provide their own protection against insurgent attacks and influence. In each of the four 
cases presented, the local defense organizations have been identified by different names; 
however, the intent of the counterinsurgency strategists has been very similar. In Malaya 
they were called ‘Home-Defenses’, in El Salvador ‘Civil-Defenses’, in Vietnam ‘Civilian 
Irregular Defense Groups’, and in Peru ‘Rondas Campesinas, Autodefensas or Civil 
Defense Committees’. 
 
3. Effectiveness  
When analyzing the effectiveness of the local defense organizations, we will not 
necessarily assume that their effectiveness at some point contributed to the final success 
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of the counterinsurgency effort.  For instance, in the cases of Vietnam and El Salvador, 
the local-defenses had a momentum with which they proved their effectiveness; 
unfortunately this success did not last for long. On the contrary, in cases like Malaya and 
Peru, despite some initial setbacks, the programs proved their effectiveness over time and 
deserved consideration by experts in the field, as an important contribution to the success 
of the applied counterinsurgency program. The effectiveness of the local defense program 
in any particular country will be determined by the following measures: 1) The degree to 
which the local-defenses protected villages affected by the insurgents and cleared areas of 
insurgent influence; 2) The degree to which they facilitated the reallocation of 
government security forces to more needed areas in order to directly confront the 
insurgents. 
 
E. CASE STUDIES 
Negating the support of the population has proved to be a key element in 
defeating insurgencies; namely terrorist and guerrilla organizations. In the last century, as 
terrorist organizations and guerrilla bands have found popular support to breed and 
become robust by appealing to social disfranchisement and internal grievances, 
meticulously calculated and orchestrated counterinsurgency strategies applied by 
governments and foreign allies have restored the relationship between the state and the 
population. A mixed strategy encompassing civil, military, intelligence, and 
psychological warfare programs, all within the context of a firm rule of law and steady 
progress towards self-government and independence, has robbed the insurgency of 
political appeal (Komer, 1972, p. v). 
In the next four Chapters, we will analyze four cases of insurgencies – Malaya, El 
Salvador, Vietnam, and Peru – in which the organization of local defenses, either as part 
of the overall counterinsurgency strategy or as an isolated effort, proved their 
effectiveness – at least during some time period for the cases of Vietnam and El Salvador 
– in denying the insurgents the rural support bases they needed to subsist. Following a 
review of the preconditions affecting each country, the organization and modus operandi 
of the insurgency, and the strategy of the state to counter the insurgency’s advance, we 
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will focus the analysis on the local defense organizations. The following cases will 
address the specific use of the local defenses, either as an essential element of the 
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Figure 1.  Malaysia, World Wide Web; Retrieved on August 12, 2004 from 
http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/asia/malasya 
 
The final victory of the Malayan government over the Malayan Communist Party 
(MPC) in July 1960 was by no means an exclusive military effort. Though during the first 
two years of the struggle the Malayan government was “flying blind” and the very 
emphasis of the state was to counter the insurgency with military means, in the following 
years, a set of measures recommended by the British government and implemented by the 
Malayan colonial government proved to be effective in countering the MCP’s advance. 
As Komer (1972) observed, it was not primarily a military effort but rather one in which 




Located in East Asia, Malaya is a small tropical country of about 500 miles long 
and no more that 100 miles wide at any point. With a central mountain range rising over 
12,000 feet, the country is subject to heavy and persistent rainfall throughout the year. As 
a consequence, the jungle and the mountains are characterized by thick vegetation that 
makes them almost impenetrable – 80% of the country is jungle. The main economic 
activities in Malaya are agriculture and mining – especially rubber, tin, and iron, being 
the world’s largest producer of both natural rubber and tin. The populated areas are 
developed with good roads and communications, a good administrative system and 
trained local officials. Half of the rural population is made up of peasants and the other 
half is composed of state and mine workers, mainly Chinese and Indians. Except for a 
150-mile land frontier with Thailand on the north and a small land frontier with 
Singapore on the South, Malaya is surrounded by a 1000-mile coast line. With a 
population of about seven million, Malaya is composed by 44% of Malay, 38.5% 
Chinese, 10.5 % Indian, 5.5% aborigines, and 1.5% other races. The official language is 
the Bahasa Melayu; however, English, Chinese, Tamil, Telugu, Malayalam, Panjabi, 
Thai, and other indigenous languages and dialects are spoken (Thompson, 1966, pp 17-
20). 
After the Japanese surrendered on August 1945, the communist guerrillas 
emerged from the Malayan jungle. Composed of Chinese left-wing groups expelled from 
the Kuomintang in the 1920’s, the Chinese immigrants introduced communism into the 
developing Southeast Asian colonies. However, even after the creation of the Malayan 
Communist Party (MCP) in 1930, communism was not a real threat to the security of the 
Colonial governments in Southeast Asia until World War II. The Japanese occupation of 
French Indochina and the defeat of the British in Malaya and Singapore in 1942, gave the 
Chinese communists enough reason to organize popular resistance under the flag of an 
Anti-Japanese movement. By 1934, a constitution for the MCP was recognized and the 
party reorganized, establishing ties with the labor unions (Stubbs, 1989, p.42). After the 
defeat of Japan and before the arrival of allied troops in Malaya, the MCP, with its 
guerrilla arm – the Malayan Peoples Anti Japanese Army (MPAJA) – were in total 
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control of the territory, having enough time to reorganize and prepare to eliminate their 
opposition. According to Thompson (1966), there were three effects of the war favoring 
the communist party: first, the strong position in which the communist parties emerged 
from the war, due to their constant resistance against the Japanese, which allowed the 
MCP to capitalize on the after effects of the war; second, the post-war era was the 
awakening of the Asian rural population to the modern world, for they were exposed to 
new needs and demands; and third, with the end of the war there was a growing 
awareness that there could be no return to the conditions of the pre-war colonial era (p. 
15). 
With the British re-occupation of Malaya, the MCP changed its theme from anti-
colonialism to anti-imperialism. Aware of its military weakness in comparison with the 
British and commonwealth troops, the MCP agreed to give certain concessions and opted 
for recognition as a legal political party. However, as the country recovered 
organizationally and economically from the war, the MCP lost appeal and turned to 
violent means to formulate its demands for a new government.  On June 1948, the 
communist insurrection broke out in Malaya. The “State of Emergency” would last for 
twelve years. For a country with a population of 5 million, the outcome of this long 
struggle had significant consequences: 4,668 civilian, 4,425 security forces and 6,710 
insurgents killed, as well as 1,287 insurgents captured and 2,702 who capitulated to 
British-Malayan forces. By 1960 the insurgency’s strength and activity had declined so 
much that the “Emergency” was officially declared over (Komer, 1972, pp. 9- 10). 
 
B. INSURGENCY STRATEGY  
The instructions for the violent uprising of the MCP in 1948 were received from 
Moscow through a communist conference held in Calcutta. The Communist movement in 
Malaya was mainly composed of the ethnic Chinese minority, which constituted a 38.5% 
of the total population, many of whom were students (Stubbs, 1989, p. 12). There was not 
much support from the Malay and Indian populace. Furthermore, in accordance with the 
Chinese Maoist precepts, their initial activities began on the rural areas of the country, 
looking forward to encircle the cities from the countryside by gaining support of the 
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Chinese population, and by establishing bases of support among Chinese squatters 
located near jungle areas. The lack of preparation of the Malayan government, as well as 
the initial failure of the Police and military forces to recognize the signals and warnings 
of an oncoming insurgency, allowed the MCP to grow and avoid the characteristic 
vulnerabilities present on the subversive build-up phase (Thompson, 1966, p. 50). 
After the British surrender in Singapore, and with the increasing threat of Japan in 
the region, the MPC formed the Malayan People’s Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA), which 
later would be supported and recognized by the United States and the United Kingdom as 
the most important resistance organization against the Japanese. This wartime alliance to 
fight the Japanese not only linked the MPAJA with British special operations units, but it 
provided the guerrillas with weapons and equipment, which were airdropped by the 
British Royal Air Force to support the resistance in Japanese held territory. 
Following the Japanese defeat and the end of the war, the MPAJA were numerous 
and well armed, as well as expert in guerrilla tactics. By the return of the first British 
troops to Malaya, the MPAJA was in de facto control in most of the country (Newsinger, 
2002, p. 35). Later on, however, the MPAJA was officially disbanded by the British 
military as part of the negotiations. The MCP then covered its armed branch with a 
number of traditional communist fronts. In addition, the large amount of weapons 
introduced into the country during the war provided them a sizeable arsenal with which to 
overthrow the Malayan government. 
The MCP was now legalized and planning to bring down the regime. The party 
appealed to the Pan-Malayan Federation of Trade Unions to increase the frequency and 
intensity of their labor strikes, as well as their terrorist actions. Taking advantage of the 
thick and deep jungle, which covered 80% of Malaya, isolated Chinese rural populations 
became the main source of recruitment and logistic support for the Maoist insurgency. 
The dense jungle also offered the guerillas the required protection and concealment to 
fight and survive, as well the necessary conditions to reorganize and plan. Beginning in 
1949, the number of incidents fell dramatically and the British authorities were confident 
that the insurgency was under control. However, this apparent retreat to the jungle was a 
deliberate maneuver to reorganize and train, as well as to extend the network of 
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supporters – the Min Yuen - among the Chinese squatters to an estimated 60,000 people 
(Newsinger, 2002, p. 45). By the end of the same year, the number of violent incidents 
started to increase exponentially, reaching a peak in July 1951, with more than 500 
incidents in this month alone (Sunderland, 1964, p. 56).  Ambushes to armed forces units, 
killings of Chinese government supporters and governmental authorities, attacks on local 
police posts, selection of rural liberated areas, organization of strikes and revolts, as well 
as coercion and extortion was all executed by the insurgency. 
 
C. THE COUNTERINSURGENCY STRATEGY 
As mentioned, during the first two years of the struggle, the British-Malayan 
government underestimated the MCP, and confused the violent actions with riots and 
social disorder. The lack of coordinated operations and shared intelligence between 
Malayan Colonial police and other military branches allowed the MCP to grow and 
organize freely during the build-up stage of the insurgency. The decree of the 
“Emergency” in Malaya on June 1948, not only proved at first to be ineffective in 
stopping the violent actions of the MCP and in negating the support of the population for 
the guerrillas, it polarized the Chinese population to support the guerrillas, increasing 
dramatically the number of incidents perpetrated as well as the number of supporters and 
militants for the party. As became obvious, conventional operations to confront the MCP 
proved to be futile, producing major casualties for the armed forces and police as well as 
to the civilian population.  Nevertheless, in the following years, though a process of trial 
and error, the Malayan government with the advice of the British government gradually 
produced a long-term, relatively low-cost strategy, which proved successful over time 
(Komer, 1972, p. 11). 
 
1. The Briggs Plan 
In the spirit, of a patient approach in April 1950, General Sir Harold Briggs, 
Director of Operations in Malaya, with the support of the High Commissioner, Sir Henry 
Gurney, planned a long-term integrated strategy to defeat the MCP. Briggs was a former 
commanding general in Burma during World War II and had significant anti-guerrilla 
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experience. The Briggs Plan was basically composed of four programs in different fields, 
but its main purpose was to separate the insurgency from the population. 
The first step of the plan was to reorganize the structure of the government. By 
creating the Federal War Council, all plans and campaigns in the state and district level 
were coordinated with a centralized direction and decentralized execution. Programs in 
the civil, military, political and economic fields were integrated in the anti-guerrilla 
cause. As a result, a higher level of coordination between the police, the armed forces, 
and local authorities was achieved. 
The second step was the resettlement of Chinese squatters. Launched in June 
1950, this program by 1952 had resettled over 400,000 people into some 400 new 
villages. However, this program produced some negative effects on the Chinese squatters 
due to the forced abandonment of their lands and crops, as well as some of their 
belongings. However, the final outcome of this program proved to be positive for the 
overall counterinsurgency strategy. On the one hand, the resettlement program isolated 
the insurgents from their primary source of support and resources. On the other hand, the 
Chinese peasants were later compensated by the government with new land, medical 
support, new infrastructure systems, and money. 
The third step of Briggs’ Plan was to reorganize the intelligence system. By 
establishing a special intelligence branch in August 1950, all information related to the 
Emergency collected by one entity. This entity was in charge of processing and 
disseminating intelligence accordingly to the units in the field (Newsinger, 2001, p. 50-
51). The previous approach of assessing the insurgency by its reported activities was 
replaced by a new approach of studying the organization and its key personnel, and 
predicting its likely course of action (Komer, 1972, p. 42). 
The fourth step, of no less importance, was to reorganize the security forces, as 
well as to reinvent the combat strategy. Mimicking the territorial organization of the 
MCP, the Malayan armed forces and police were reorganized on a territorial basis. Small-
unit operations replaced the large-unit approach; which had proved to be inadequate to 
fight guerrillas and caused friendly casualties in the early years of the struggle. An 
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important aspect of the British-Malayan effort to reorganize security forces and to negate 
MCP’s influence over the resettled populations was the implementation of the Home 
Guard Security, which were built up to protect the Malay Kampongs and Chinese new 
squatters. This will be analyzed in depth deep later in this section. 
 
2. Templer’s Plan 
After the assassination of High Commissioner Gurney by a guerrilla platoon of 
the MCP, and the retirement of General Briggs on November 1951, General Sir Gerald 
Templer was appointed by the British government as both High Commissioner and 
Director of Operations in Malaya. Empowered by this new degree of authority, Templer, 
working with the plan left by Briggs, energized the program and reduced the 
bureaucracy. His main concerns were: 1) to maintain unified control of civil and military 
forces; 2) to reorganize and train the police; 3) to increase the educational effort, 
especially in the primary schools, in order to win the war of ideas; 4) to improve the 
protection of the resettled areas; 5) to ensure that the best men were recruited for the civil 
service; 6) to bolster the security forces; 7) to give higher priority to the intelligence 
effort; 8) to tighten the control over food and supplies in order to isolate the guerrillas; 9) 
to develop effective psychological operations campaigns in order to improve civil-
military relations and encourage desertion from the MCP’s ranks, files and; 10) to 
enlarge, arm, and train the Home Guards in order disrupt the relation between the  
insurgents and the population (Stubbs, 1989, Ch. 6). 
 
3. The Home Guard Security 
The Home Guard was not an invention of the Emergency; these organizations had 
a long history in the Malay villages, where they were first created to protect the local 
population from crime and robbery.  However, they were first addressed as part of the 
counterinsurgency effort by General Briggs in September 1950 (Komer, 1972, p. 40). At 
the time Templer was appointed, the Home Guards were already supporting police 
defensive operations in the resettled areas or Strategic Hamlets; however, these 
organizations were very limited in their scope due to the government’s inability to arm 
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them properly. To rectify the problem, Templer’s new Inspector-General, Major-General 
E. B. de Fonblanque, in April 1952, started building up an organization independent from 
the police and capable of defending the rural population against guerrilla attacks (Stubbs, 
1989, p. 158). Templer also insisted on the need to recruit, train, and arm with shotguns 
local Chinese to help protect their villages: eventually some 50,000 Chinese were 
recruited in total (Newsinger, 2002, p. 54). If by the end of 1948 the Home Guards 
numbered about 17,000, by the end of 1949 they were about 47,000, and by the end of 
1951 they included 99,000 men (Komer, 1972, p.40). 
Another important adjunct to the police were the aboriginal forces created within 
the hill tribes whom inhabited the jungles. Thus the initial attempts to resettle these tribes 
failed dramatically, producing a high mortality among the aborigines due to the effects of 
diseases and despair. The establishment of jungle forts in the interior of the jungle 
improved the relations with the aborigines, providing them with medical and other 
facilities.  The Special Air Service (SAS) played an important role in this endeavor by 
organizing and training these tribes to confront the insurgency (Newsinger, 2002, p. 56). 
A small aboriginal force, the Senoi Pra’ak, numbering not more than 300, accounted for 
more terrorists killed in the last two years of the Emergency than all the rest of the 
security forces put together (Thompson, 1966, p.153). The creation of the Kinta Valley 
Home Guard (KVHG) was another important asset on this part of the overall strategy. 
Under this scheme proposed by a leading Chinese politician, Leong Yew Koh, the miners 
in the sensitive areas would pay full-time armed Home Guards to provide security for the 
area (Stubbs, 1989, p. 158). 
By the end of 1953 more than 2000 hamlets through all the country were well 
organized with Home Guard security. The organization within each hamlet consisted of 
Static and Operational Home Guard. One third of the static Home Guards was armed and 
had a more defensive duty. The group was normally composed of 35 people who were 
distributed, on daily basis, into groups of five to take the night shift in the perimeters of 
the village. The Operational Home Guards, on the other hand, were uniformed and 
organize into a 12 man armed section, and had a more active role in supporting some 
military and police operations in the surrounding areas. To establish a clear chain of 
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command, each state had its Home Guard Officer, each district had its District Officer, 
and subordinate to the District Officer was an Inspector. The Home Guard Officer was 
responsible of recruiting, training, and administrating the Home Guards. 
Since the real intention behind the establishment of Home Defenses was to isolate 
the insurgency both physically and politically from the population, in order to negate the 
necessary support and resources for the insurgency to survive, the contribution of the 
Home Guards to the effort of the British-Malayan government was invaluable. The 
progressive lack of support and cooperation of the population with the MCP guerrillas 
pushed the guerrillas to the jungle, where military saturation operations and the lack of 
resources threatened the MCP’s survivability and finally led to their defeat. The Home 
Guards also played an important role in providing reliable information about the position 
and constitution of the guerrillas. At the same time, the Home Guard policy in Malaya, 
allowed the release of thousands of armed forces and police personnel for other 
assignments, extending the control of the government to more sensitive areas of the 
country; particularly in the jungle (Stubbs, 1989, p. 159). In 1955, as the guerrilla 
strength decreased from 7,000-10,000 to 3,000, the security establishment also began to 
be reduced. 
By the end of 1959, as the situation began to improve and the Emergency was 
about to end, the Home Guard was gradually demobilized. Despite the fact that there is 
not much evidence related to the Home Guard’s demobilization process, it appears that 
the government had a tight control over the weapons provided to these organizations. For 
example, according to the High Commissioner’s Press Conference (1954), after two years 
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Figure 2.   El Salvador, World Wide Web; Retrieved on August 12, 2004 from 
http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/america/elsalvador_ 
 
Despite the different motivations, composition, support, and approach of the 
Malayan insurgency, the explosion of the insurgency in El Salvador, was inspired by the 
same communist ideology. The successful revolution of the Sandinistas against the 
powerful and oppressive regime of Somoza in Nicaragua in 1979, as well as the chaotic 
situation of a country controlled by a small oligarchy, the failure of the first military 
Junta, and the illegitimate perception of the government by a disfranchised population 
acted as a catalyst to exploit in the violent insurrection of the Frente de Liberacion 
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Nacional Marxista Farabundo Marti (FMLN) in El Salvador, which aimed to overthrow 
the existing political system. 
 
A. PRECONDITIONS  
El Salvador, with a population of five million, is the smallest country in Central 
American. The tropical weather and the volcanic soil make of it a fertile ground for the 
cultivation of crops such as coffee.  The country has a 120 miles border with Guatemala 
on the northwest, a 213 miles border with Honduras on the Southwest, and a sea cost line 
on the Pacific Ocean of 190 miles. El Salvador is separated by only 16 miles from the 
Nicaragua Sandinista, through the Gulf of Fonseca. The terrain is mostly mountainous 
with a narrow coastal belt and central plateau. The highest elevation of the mountain 
range is Mount El Pital at 8,190 feet above sea level. Other elevations include Santa Ana 
with 7095 feet, San Vicente with 6546 feet, and San Salvador with 5829 feet. The 
population is composed by 90% Mestizo, 9% White, and 1% Amerindian. The country is 
one of the most densely populated in the world and no striking cultural differences can be 
observed between the people from one end of the country to the other.  There are few 
remote areas like Chalatenango, Morazan, and San Vicente. As a reference, by 1997 of 
the 6,268 miles of roads in the whole country 5,026 were unpaved. Although the official 
language is Spanish, some Amerindians speak Nahua (Salvador, 2000, p.1). 
In 1979, after the fall of the Somoza regime in Nicaragua, the Salvadoran military 
and the US government became concerned that something similar may occur in El 
Salvador. Dissatisfied with the bad economic situation in the country, the popular 
disenchantment, the ineptitude of successive military governments, and the formation of 
guerrilla forces in the countryside, a group of Salvadoran Colonels overthrew the 
dictatorship of General Carlos Humberto Romero and established a civil-military 
coalition or “junta de revolucionaria”. The junta, aware that there was a necessity to 
diminish the grievances affecting the peasants in order to negate the FMLN’s insurgency 
of popular support, offered a reform program, which included guarantees of human, and 
civil rights, land reform, and economic development (Johnson, 2001, p. 116). Until that 
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point, over 70% of the land was owned by only 1% of the population, while over 40% of 
the rural population owned no land at all (Schwarz, 1991, p. 44). 
Beginning in 1979, as a way to secure economic and military aid from the US, the 
Junta Revolucionaria appointed as President of the new Junta de Gobierno, Jose 
Napoleon Duarte, a center-left politician who had been taken the elections by the ruling 
class and the military in 1972. Concerned by the triumph of the revolution in Nicaragua 
and the potential threat posed by the Sandinistas in Central America, on December 1980, 
a first package of economic aid at $20 millions was authorized by the Carter 
administration to support the counterinsurgency effort in El Salvador. 
Following the election of Ronald Reagan on January 1981, and fearing a massive 
infusion of military aid to suffocate the insurgency, the FMLN launched what they called 
the “final offensive” against the Salvadoran regime (Johnson 2001, p. 117); however, a 
miscalculation on the expected support of the Salvadoran population to seize the 
government prevented the FMLN from achieving its objectives and gave a temporary 
victory to the government. Despite this failure at the beginning of 1981, the FMLN’s 
alliance maintained the initiative during the first three years of the war. The lack of a 
clear policy to defeat the insurgency would lead to more military repression against the 
population, consequently increasing popular support for the FMLN.  By then, the FMLN 
had control of great portions of the territory, while fourteen provinces of El Salvador 
were occupied by the guerrillas (Corum, nd. p.3). 
Between 1981 and 1984, the two sides fought largely separate wars; on the one 
hand, the FMLN consolidated its base of support in the countryside and moved closer to 
defeating the Salvadoran armed forces; on the other hand, the United States advisors and 
the Salvadoran government were focused on legitimizing the Salvadoran system and in 
engineering a winning strategy to defeat the enemy (Byrne, 1996, p. 123). 
By 1984, both sides were fighting the same war; a war to win the hearts and 
minds of the population. At this point, both the Salvadoran armed forces and the FMLN 
had accepted the fact that a decisive outcome to the war was more achievable politically, 
than militarily. From then on, the control and support of the population would be the 
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main objective of both contenders to achieve victory.  Overall, the objective of the US 
and the Salvadoran armed forces was to win popular support and isolate the insurgency 
by using a comprehensive program of civic action, psychological operations and civil 
defense, combined with small-unit tactics and constant military patrolling (Byrne, 1996, 
pp. 131—132). 
On January 1984, the Kissinger Commission released its report on Central 
America, which addressed the root causes of the upheavals in the region and the Soviet 
and Cuban support for the FMLN, and addressed recommendations in the civil-military 
fields to defeat the FMLN. However, strong confrontations with partial victories for the 
FMLN continued up to 1990. In 1991 a national cease-fire agreement between the 
Salvadoran government and the FMLN, followed by a peace treaty between both parties 
in 1992, ended this long struggle. 
During this 12 year’s war, an estimate of 75,000 - 100,000 individuals lost their 
lives, and there were considerable economic looses; considering that El Salvador is a 
country of only five million inhabitants. By the end of the war in 1992, El Salvador had 
absorbed at least $ 4.5 billion, over $ 1 billion of which was in military aid (Schwarz, 
1991, p. 2). 
 
B. INSURGENCY STRATEGY  
In the 1970’s the Frente de Liberacion Nacional Marxista Farabundo Marti 
(FMLN), backed by mayor rebel factions such as the People’s Revolutionary Army 
(ERP), the Popular Liberation Forces (FPL), the Armed Forces of National Resistance 
(FARN), the Armed Forces of Liberation/Salvador Communist Party, and the Central 
American Workers’ Revolutionary Party (PRTC), emerged to challenge the ruling 
oligarchy composed by the military government and the armed forces (Heigh, 1990, p. 
125-127). In late 1979, as the guerrillas initiated a series if indirect and direct attacks 
throughout the country, the first junta increased the amount of state repression 
dramatically. In trying to conceal themselves from the constant strikes of the armed 
forces and police, the guerillas moved to the countryside, where they began to develop a 
plan to overthrow the existing political system. 
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By 1980, the FMLN had an estimated 12,000 fighters and logistic support from 
the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua through the Gulf of Fonseca. The extended land 
frontier with Honduras and Guatemala also facilitated the flow of light weapons and 
supplies from the Soviet bloc and Cuba through land, air, and sea. By then, the FMLN 
had created a sanctuary in the mountain range which limits the border with Honduras and 
had established fortifications in the surrounding areas of Monte Guazapa, only thirty 
miles from San Salvador (Corum, n.d, p. 4). Furthermore, it was estimate that on January 
of this same year, the FMLN had $53 million collected through kidnapping and, 
following arms purchases, retained as much as $ 20 million (Byrne, 1996, pp. 56). 
However, it was not until late 1981 that the FMLN felt strongly enough to seize the 
actual ruling system and launched the “final offensive”. The major factor that prevented 
the FMLN from taking power during this offensive was timing: The FMLN was 
unprepared to take advantage of the opportunity offered (pp. 66). 
Between 1982 and early 1983 the FMLN had control over one third of El 
Salvador. As the situation in El Salvador continued to deteriorate, the FMLN felt 
confident that a guerrilla foco-based insurrection could succeed. Accordingly, they began 
large-scale field operations, leaving the strategy of ambushes and night attack, for more 
conventional warfare. However this strategy inflicted great casualties on the armed 
forces; it also proved to be futile against the Salvadoran army, which was recovering 
from its previous lethargy and, by 1984, had increased its strength from 12,000 to 42,000 
troops (Corum, n.d. p. 4). 
Another shift of the FMLN military strategy came in 1984. After President Duarte 
offered a peace treaty to the United Nations, inviting the FMLN to join, many guerrillas 
began to defect to the government. Aware of this change, the leadership of the FMLN 
became convinced that the foco model, based on the use of a guerrilla army, had largely 
ignored the support of the people (Johnson 2001, p. 117). In the following years, the 
FMLN continued to confront the Salvadoran armed forces, trying at the same time to 
increase their popular base; however, their violent means to gain support alienated 
potential supporters abroad, hurt the democratic left in the elections, and turned off the 
public (125). 
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Nevertheless, on November 11, 1989, as the situation in El Salvador began to 
stabilize and the rightist party ARENA won the elections – providing an important 
element of popular support for the government, the FMLN launched a strong offensive 
against the new regime. This offensive targeted military units and governmental 
infrastructure in the capital, San Miguel, Santa Ana, and other departments. By the end of 
the offensive, on December 5, the FMLN had lost 1,773 men and had 1,717 wounded 
(Corum, n.d, p. 10). Nevertheless the insurgents did not accomplish their main objectives; 
the offensive was so violent, that the FMLN almost destroyed the most important 
Salvadoran air force base in Ilopango (p. 10). As the war continued in 1990, the FMLN 
was still capable of perpetrating a number of attacks against the armed forces; only on 
this year, the FMLN inflicted 2000 casualties to the armed forces and police. 
 
C. THE COUNTERINSURGENCY STRATEGY 
Between 1979 and 1980 the build-up phase of the civil war was complete. As 
confrontation between the state and important sectors of the population reached 
considerable levels, the failure of the reformist movement promoted by the Junta 
Revolucionaria and the rightist groups, became evident (Chavez, n.d, p. 2). 
At that time, the Salvadoran armed forces were ill prepared and counted an 
estimated 10,000 troops and 7,000 paramilitary police forces. The Salvadoran Air Force 
(FAS) was composed of only 1,000 men and a total of 67 old aircrafts (Corum, n.d, p. 2--
3). According to Sheehan, the Salvadoran armed forces were built up on the large-unit 
model and their response to the guerrilla threat was to increase numbers over that model, 
including a massive expansion of the Air force (Sheehan, 1989, p. 139). 
By 1979, US analysts and intelligence personnel were already reporting on the 
bad situation in El Salvador, and on January 1980, as the first junta resigned, a second 
junta was establish to govern for two year. This civil-military junta was to be held 
together by US persuasion. Yet also by 1980 there was a high priority on the Carter 
administration to suffocate the insurgency. By then, the old state-terror infrastructure 
used on the 60’s and 70’s was revitalized by some former members of the government. 
Civil intelligence networks and vigilante organizations that were part of the rural 
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paramilitary groups (ORDEN) of the past were reorganized to conduct a “dirty war” 
program, in which known leftist members were targeted by death-squads (Byrne, 1996, p. 
57). In fact, preventing the leftist from seizing power was the highest priority of the 
Carter administration and, the key to achieving this goal, was to provide the Salvadoran 
armed forces with enough military aid and training. 
During this time period, US policy makers and military advisors tried in vain to 
convince the armed forces to employ an offensive approach to defeating the FMLN. The 
plan was to gain the initiative by attacking the guerrillas in their controlled territories 
with small-unit tactics and air support. At the same time, there was a need for the military 
to protect key economic areas and populated centers to deny the FLMN of popular 
support and resources. The use of civil actions would help in wining the war of ideas by 
improving the government-population relations, and the use of civil defense units would 
help in dealing with the security threat in isolated areas, releasing military units to 
confront the insurgency directly. 
In practice, however, the Salvadoran armed forces had a quite different approach. 
Reliance on air campaigns to bomb populated areas in control of the FMLN and guerrilla 
bases increased the number of non-combatants casualties, alienating local populations in 
favor of the insurgents. The plan to protect key infrastructure became an excuse for the 
ESAF to stay out of the offensive and in a more secure place. At one point between 1981 
and 1984, half of the troops were occupied in static defense of infrastructure. Offensive 
operations were conducted in conventional terms through highways and main roads; thus 
giving the FMLN great opportunity to attack at the place and time of their choosing. Civil 
and military casualties increased dramatically during this time period; the former, 
basically due to the repression applied by the armed forces and police, but also by the 
violent means of coercion used by the FMLN, the latter due to treacherous guerrilla 
attacks to military conventional units. According to Byrne (1996), in early 1981, 20 
soldiers per day were killed by the insurgents (p. 79). 
Overall, with a corrupt military local Command and the lack of compromise of 
the troops to defeat the insurgents, the counterinsurgency strategy on the early years of 
the struggle switched the balance to the side of the insurgents. Nevertheless, the most 
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important achievement during this time period was the implementation of the 
recommendations provided by the Woerner report. Under this scheme, between 1981 and 
1984, the ESAF was to duplicate in number, with similar increases in equipment, fixed-
wing aircrafts and helicopters. However, these efforts only maintained the status quo 
between both; neither the ESAF nor the FMLN were leading the struggle. As evaluated 
by the US Embassy, at that point: there was no military end in sight to the war of attrition 
in El Salvador (p. 82). Between 1982 and 1983, the FMLN controlled an area of more 
than 1,000 square miles, and had the support of at least 100,000 people, marking the 
Salvadoran’s military lowest level of control through all the war. 
By mid-1984, the balance of war shifted dramatically and the ESAF recovered the 
military initiative lost in the previous years. A change on the FMLN’s strategy towards a 
“people’s war”, with more emphasis on the political aim of gaining popular support, 
made it necessary for the Salvadoran armed forces to consider a new strategy 
encompassing politic and military programs, giving greater importance to the former. The 
victory of Duran in the 1984 elections gave hope to the US government and its military 
advisors that the war could have an end.  The concern of the Reagan administration that 
communism could spread through Central America was expressed in more military and 
economic aid for the region. The report of the Kissinger commission released on January 
1984, addressed the importance of determining the root causes of the insurgency in 
Central America, while recommending a comprehensive and orchestrated strategy to 
defeat the insurgency. The specific goals established for El Salvador were: economic 
stabilization, growth of the economy, broadening the benefits of economic growth, 
promotion of democracy and respect for human rights, guaranteeing security through 
coordinated military and civic actions, and achieving a diplomatic settlement to the 
conflict (Byrne, 1996, p. 126).  These goals were to be taken into practice by establishing 
three interdependent strategies: Politic, Economic, and Politic-Military strategies. 
According to the politic strategy, five measures were to be taken: 1) building of a 
legitimate political system and government; 2) improving human rights and subordinating 
the military to civilian control; 3) continuing the system of elections in order to guarantee 
the overall participation of the populace; 4) maintaining the socioeconomic reforms of the 
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early 1980’s and; 5) creating a workable system of justice. The economic strategy would 
focus on social programs, increasing the living standards of the majority, extending the 
control of the government, limiting government spending, expanding production and 
exports, and encouraging private investment. The political-military strategy was to be 
matched with the economic and politic strategy. While these two strategies operated at 
the macro level, the political-military strategy was to be focused on the micro level in 
order to separate the insurgents from their support base. 
The scheme to accomplish this goal encompassed five points: 1) Separation of the 
FMLN from its supporters in the insurgents’ rearguard areas with the use of air 
bombardment, artillery, and destruction of crops on rebel zones; 2) increase of the 
government’s presence in conflicting areas by using combined civic-action programs; 3) 
implementation of psychological operations directed towards the civilian population and 
the FMLN; 4) nationwide coordinated counterinsurgency programs to recover key areas 
and win the local population; and 5) creation of civil-defense patrols in rural areas. By 
committing themselves to protect their villages, the individuals would collaborate with 
the existing order and reject the insurgent’s proposal (Bacevich, 1988, p. 40). 
Nevertheless, between 1984 and 1989, the Kissinger Commission 
recommendations would not be implemented to their full extent, and due to the inability 
of the Salvadoran government to unify the forces within the counterrevolution coalition, 
the inability to convince the Salvadoran armed forces to recognize the importance of 
ending the violations of human-rights, the failure to isolate the FLMN in the countryside 
and win the war of ideas, and the underestimation of the military and political strength of 
the FMLN, the war would continue until 1,990 with no clear victor and constant large-
scale attacks on both sides (Byrne, 1996, p.162). 
 
D. CIVIL DEFENSES IN EL SALVADOR 
As mentioned earlier, the civil defense program was part of the overall US and El 
Salvador’s government strategy to defeat the FMLN. The creation of civil defense patrols 
in the countryside was seen by the counterinsurgency strategists as a key element in 
defeating the insurgency in El Salvador. The civil defense patrols would help isolate the 
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guerrillas from key areas, extend the control of the state within the country, and support 
the rebuilding of damaged infrastructure. However, the one solution that would save the 
counterinsurgency program in El Salvador - as expressed by a MILGROUP commander 
referring to the Civil Defenses – was more an expectation than a reality (Bacevich 1988, 
p. 41). 
Despite the fact that the Civil Defense program was part of the US policy in El 
Salvador, in practice, there was no clear intention to implement them. Furthermore, the 
controversial history of Civil Defense organizations in El Salvador, presented more 
obstacles for their implementation due to the rejection of important sectors of the 
population. 
The first Civil Defense organizations in El Salvador were the Canton patrols or 
territorial services, which were organized with army reservists and local peasants in the 
early 1900’s, in order to carry out police-type patrols. These organizations, along with the 
National Guard of the time, were involved in the 1932 massacre of an estimate of 30,000 
people that ended a communist-led peasant revolt. Decades later, between 1967 and 
1969, and based on the previous Canton patrols, Col. Jose Alberto Medrano, Chief of the 
National Guard, created a similar organization called ORDEN. The main mission of this 
organization was to penetrate every village and identify and eliminate communists among 
the rural populations. Between 1977 and 1979, ORDEN was estimated at between 50,000 
and 100,000 individuals; however, the real core of the organization was calculated at 
around 10,000 (INS Resource Information Center, 2001, pp.1-2). In late 1979, ORDEN 
was dissolved on paper, although it was replaced by the Civil Defense organizations 
proposed by the US and the Salvadoran military junta. 
Despite isolated and restricted efforts of the US advisors and some local 
Salvadoran Commanders to support the Civil Defense program as part of the strategy to 
regain and extend the control over the population, the program lacked a general 
commitment at the highest levels of the Salvadoran government and military. This lack of 
compromise would finally lead to a hollow achievement. Furthermore, another barrier to 
join these organizations was the lack of trust in a quick response - if at all - of the armed 
forces to assist an eventual attack of the FMLN. Proof of this was that by late 1987, in the 
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highly conflicting departments of Morazan, Chalatenango, and La Union, the numbers of 
Civil Defense militias had been reduced substantially (INS Resource Information Center, 
2001, p. 3); Chalatenango had only seven detachments, La Union five, and Morazan only 
one (Byrne, 1996, p. 148). 
According to one assessment, the weaknesses of the Civil Defense program also 
reflected the modest resources invested in its implementation. By late 1987, of the 240 
Civil Defense detachments organized within the country, only 100 were “certified,” 
meaning that they were the elected to receive M-14 rifles or M2 carbines and perhaps a 
small radio transmitter. Uncertified units did not receive even that. The lack of payment, 
as well as the lack of air evacuation if wounded, and a proper compensation for death, 
limited the reasons for joining to patriotism. The constant involvement in massacres and 
human rights violations attributed to the Civil Defense organizations in El Salvador and 
the direct targeting of these organizations by the FMLN guerrillas, also limited the appeal 
to join.  Even training and ammunition were very limited and depended on the good will 
of the local military commander.  Nevertheless, the lack of support to the program was 
not the unique responsibility of the Salvadoran armed forces.  A great share of the 
responsibility fell on the US in terms of its priorities and spending. In comparison to the 
US investment in the Salvadoran Air force and maneuver battalions, the investments in 
the implementation of local defenses were very limited (Bacevich, 1988, p. 41). 
By the end of the war, despite some notable exceptions, like the Civil Defense 
Training Camp program developed by Master Sergeant Bruce Hazelwood at San Juan 
Opico, 30 miles from San Salvador, the Civil Defense program in El Salvador did not 
contribute much to the US-El Salvador counterinsurgency effort. Had the efforts of 
Hazelwood been capitalized on as a force multiplier to spread legitimate and respectful 
human rights Civil Defense organizations, the Salvadorian government could have had 
regained the support and control of the population in the rural areas. By achieving the 
latter goal, the struggle between the Salvadorian government and the FMLN could have 
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A. PRECONDITIONS  
Located in South East Asia, Vietnam, is a country of approximately 750 miles 
long and no more than 100 miles wide.  The maritime borders of Vietnam are the Gulf of 
Thailand, the gulf of Tonkin, and the South China Sea. A long land frontier is extended 
with Cambodia (767 miles), with China (800 miles), and with Laos (1,331 miles). The 
climate in Vietnam is tropical in the South and monsoonal in the north. As a consequence 
of the rainy season, the jungle and the mountains are characterized by dense vegetation. 
The terrain is low, flat delta in the south and north, with central highlands and hilly 
mountains in the far north and northwest.  The highest elevation is the Ngoc Linh (9,429 
feet). Vietnam is a mainly agricultural country and the world’s primary producer of rice 
(Mekong Delta area – South Vietnam). Of its population of fourteen million people, 
twelve million are peasants. Compared to Malaysia, many of the populated areas in 
Vietnam are inaccessible. As a reference, by 1996 of the 58,312 miles of roads in the 
whole country 43,676 were unpaved. Transport is mainly dependable on waterways. The 
composition of the population is 85 to 90 % Vietnamese, 3% Chinese, and the rest is 
composed of other minorities such as Muong, Tai, Meo, and Westerners. The official 
language is Vietnamese, but Chinese, English, French and other tribal languages and 
dialects are spoken. 
As mentioned, communism in South East Asia received its main influence from 
China in the 1920’s. At this time, the Far Eastern Bureau of the Comintern was 
established in Shanghai, and a large number of Chinese immigrants looked for better 
opportunities in the developed southeast colonies and protectorates. Nevertheless, only in 
Vietnam did they succeed in penetrating nationalist political movements, which were 
already formed in opposition to France’s 100 years’ of colonial power (Thompson, 1966, 
p. 14). 
Since World War II, and under Ho Chi Minh’s direction, the traditional 
opposition to the colonial power increased notoriously. Ho Chi Minh, known as the “man 
who remains awake when everyone else is asleep” or “the general,” organized the 
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Vietnamese resistance movement against foreign control into a nationalistic political and 
military organization called the Vietminh. 
By 1945, Ho Chi Minh possessed an army of some 3,000 men (Baritz, 1985, p. 
59). In March of that same year, the Japanese took the administration of the country off 
the hands of the French, who were drying the country’s economy. By the end of World 
War II, both France and Japan had lost influence in Vietnam, providing an opportunity 
for Ho Chi Minh to attempt establishing an independent and unified nation. To reinforce 
his campaign, and as a former OSS agent, he requested the support of the United Stated 
through a representative of the Office of Strategic Service; however, this support never 
came. Other issues like the Korean War and tension with the Soviet Union received top 
priority from the Roosevelt and Truman Administrations. After the Japanese surrendered, 
Ho Chi Minh founded the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. The celebration of this event 
gathered 400,000 people and included the presence of US military officers who saluted 
the new flag of North Vietnam (p. 61). 
As had been arranged in the Potsdam Conference, the British temporarily re-
occupied Saigon to disarm the Japanese on the south, and the Nationalist Chinese with 
150,000 troops occupied Hanoi in order to liberate the north. After robbing the country, 
the Anti-Communist Chinese returned the control of the north to the Vietminh. Contrary 
to what was expected by the Vietnamese, the British turned control of the south to the 
French. As a consequence, the French were faced with an immediate guerrilla war against 
the Vietminh. Neither the Vietminh nor the French could accept this outcome. The 
French wanted to recover their colonies and restore the nations in Indochina, while the 
Vietminh wanted a unify country, including North and South Vietnam. In February 1950, 
the United States formally recognized France’s governor, Bao Dai, who immediately 
became Ho Chi Minh’s enemy. In the following years, the initial economic aid of $10 
million a year provided to the French by the Truman administration was increased by 
President Eisenhower to $ 400 million a year. From then on, in order to support the 
Truman Doctrine of containment against the Soviet Union, the French would maintain 
the fight against communism in South-East Asia. Despite all this support, the Vietminh’s 
capacity to fight and to seize French positions grew dramatically to 100,000 regular army 
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troops, 50,000 regional troops, and 250,000 guerrillas (Baritz, 1985, p. 81). In March 
1954, France fought its last battle against the Vietminh in the Area of Dien Bien Phu. 
Fifty-five days after this battle began, by May 7, France was defeated, having to 
surrender to the Vietminh army. 
In this same year, with the Geneva Agreement signed between France and 
Vietnam, the country was divided in two; the communist North and the free and 
independent South where Ngo Dinh Diem became Prime Minister and, after declaring a 
new republic, the first President. The Geneva agreement also demanded that elections be 
held later on in order to define the future of Vietnam. However, elections would never be 
held. Believing that Ho Chi Minh would have 80% of the votes, the US supported Diem’s 
motion to cancel the elections. As a consequence, and convinced that the only acceptable 
formula was a unified Vietnam; Ho Chi Minh resorted to the insurgent approach against 
South Vietnam. At the same time, the poor administration of the land and resources, 
nepotism, the systematic discrimination of the Buddhist majority, as well as the 
increasing repression by the Diem government of its political opponents, exacerbated the 
populace inside South Vietnam, creating fertile ground for the insurgency to develop. 
On May 13, 1959, the 15th Plenum of the Party Central Committee took place in 
Hanoi.  As a result of this event, communist representatives from all around the world 
called for revolution in South Vietnam against the Diem dictatorship. The Southern 
guerillas, which were trained by Hanoi since 1954, began to infiltrate into South Vietnam 
to organize the Communist infrastructure. The next step was the announcement of the 
formation of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam; a front group for the 
Communist effort to conquer the south (Boot, 2002, pp. 287-288). In the following years, 
the armed front of this movement, the People’s Liberation Armed Forces, which would 
be later called the Vietcong (Vietnamese Communists), increased its strength and control 
over the South, provoking US concern and assistance, as well as its later military 
involvement. By 1965 the US would send the first 3,500 troops – Marines – to Vietnam. 
This would be the longest US conflict in history, with an involvement of almost 3 million 
men, and a death toll of 58,000 US soldiers. 
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B. THE INSURGENCY STRATEGY 
After the French defeat in Dien Bien Phu in 1954, the Communist Party in the 
North felt more confident about its ideal of liberating the South and unifying both 
Vietnams. By 1960, the Vietcong was launching campaigns to assassinate and intimidate 
Southern officials in Saigon and they were taking control of great portions of the Mekong 
Delta, the highlands, and the coastal plains outside the major cities. Afraid of getting 
involved in another war in Asia, President Kennedy increased economic and military aid, 
as well as the number of military advisors in South Vietnam; however, until 1965 no 
military troops were sent to Vietnam. 
Some three years after the assassination of both Diem in November, and President 
Kennedy in December 1963, the government of Saigon was again able to counter the 
insurgents with a strongman. Nguyen Van Theiu emerged as the new president in the 
South. However, this period of indecision, and to certain extent of inaction, gave the 
communist enough room to maneuver and for the infiltration of men and weapons to the 
South through the Ho Chi Minh Trail network. 
A mentioned by General Vo Nguyen Giap, Commander of the North Vietnamese 
armed forces, it was a People’s War. It was a war designed to avoid contact with the 
enemy, and to be consistent with this idea, the campaign had to be developed in three 
phases. In the fist stage, loyal cadres were to be sent out to propagandize and create in the 
countryside a proactive belt of sympathizers willing to provide food, supplies, and 
information, as well as recruits. In the second stage, a protracted guerrilla struggle was to 
be launched in order to eliminate collaborators, government officials, and reactionary 
elements, as well as to attack vulnerable military and police outposts. The third stage was 
to be launched when the insurgents had momentum. In this stage, the formation of 
conventional armies, as well as the use of conventional tactics, in conjunction with a 
general uprising, would lead to finishing the enemy and creating a new republic (Boot, 
2002, p. 294). 
By 1964 the communist increased their attacks on the South Vietnam forces. The 
use of guerrilla hit and run tactics were the main form of attack and caused high 
casualties to the Southern government troops. Thus, it seemed like the North Vietnamese 
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were infiltrating the South in large-scale conventional units. By 1966 only 38,000 
People’s Army North Vietnamese troops were in the South. At this point, the Vietcong 
guerrillas numbered some 220,000 troops. Between 1965 and 1966, the number of 
Communist attacks in Battalion size or greater numbers decreased dramatically, while the 
number of small-scale attacks increased 150% during this time period (p. 295). The 
Vietcong had the initiative. They could attack at the place and times selected and were 
willing to accept many more casualties than their opponents, as well as to extend the war 
indefinitely. The infiltration of weapons and supplies, supported by Moscow and Peking 
through the long land frontier with Laos and Cambodia, improved their military strength 
to seize South Vietnam forces. Isolated police posts and military stations constituted 
another source of weapons, ammunition, and explosives. A great emphasis by the 
Vietcong was also put on the recruitment of new cadres from isolated populations and 
tribes. As a Maoist inspired organization, the Vietcong were totally convinced, and 
finally proved, that the key to their success was control of the population. Their political 
aim was the control of the rural areas, and the destruction of the government’s prestige 
and authority (Thompson, 1966, p. 29). Under this scheme, the Civil Guard units 
organized at the strategic hamlet level to isolate the Vietminh from the population began 
to constituted important targets for the insurgent to attack. 
The use of nigh attacks, ambushes, the infiltration of informers in hamlets and 
villages, as well the informer’s capacity to easily disappear in the jungle, made the 
Vietcong guerrillas an increasing threat for the security in the region. This was especially 
evident after the attack on the USS Maddox in the Gulf of Tonkin in August 1964. This 
attack would later unchain the involvement of US troops in Vietnam for the next 10 
years. 
 
C. THE COUNTERINSURGENCY STRATEGY 
Looking back at the events, it is far from certain that there was a 
counterinsurgency strategy before the Marines landed on the beaches of Danang in 1965. 
Furthermore, it is arguable whether there was a coherent counterinsurgency program after 
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this landing and up to the US withdrawal in 1975; however, it would be unfair to say that 
no one effort was made in this direction. 
By 1960, with the increase of the Vietcong control over South Vietnam, the first 
reaction of the US government on behalf of the Kennedy Administration was to increase 
aid and the number of US advisers. At that point, the reluctance to send combat troops 
were largely influenced by the latter’s experience in the Korean Peninsula. By 1963 there 
were 12,000 US advisers in South Vietnam, and after Kennedy’s death this number 
would increase dramatically. The US advisers, trying to duplicate their earlier experience 
in the Caribbean and erroneously expecting an invasion from the North, organized the 
South Vietnamese forces into conventional units, including heavy armor, artillery, air 
force, navy, marines, and rangers (Boot, 2002, p. 288); however, the enemy was fighting 
in a different format. The enemy was wisely using guerrilla tactics to compensate their 
limited capacities. 
After the attack on the USS Maddox in 1964, the first reaction of the Johnson 
Administration did not take long. On March 1965, the US launched an air bombing 
campaign over Northern Vietnam. The air campaign, Rolling Thunder, lasted for three 
years and was intended to force Hanoi to negotiate a peaceful end to the struggle; 
however, it proved to be ineffective. The bombing pauses and the limitations imposed to 
the targets by President Johnson, created the opposite effect, allowing North Vietnam 
forces to reorganize and improve their air defense capabilities (p. 291).  The 
reorganization of the guerrillas became evident in February 1965 when the Vietcong 
launched an attack over the US airfield in Pleiku. In this incident, 10 US aircrafts were 
destroyed, 100 Americans were wounded, and 8 Americans killed. As a reaction to this 
attack, in the next month, the first combat troops were deployed – 3,500 US Marines to 
secure the US airbase at Danang. 
By the end of July 1965, a request from the US Military Assistance Command, 
General Westmoreland, was accepted by President Truman, adding 44 maneuver 
battalions with a total of 200,000 men for offensive operations. Despite the early 
enthusiasm of President Kennedy for low-intensity conflict and the recommendations 
made by the CIA, the Marines, and guerrilla warfare experts such as Sir Robert 
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Thompson, the military mindset of the time was focalized on conventional operations.  At 
this point the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support program 
(CORDS) was created. Headed by Robert Komer, member of the National Security 
Council since the Kennedy Administration, the program was to integrate the various US 
military and civil programs in order to pacify the South Vietnamese provinces. However, 
it had one significant limitation; the program competed with the “big unit” war conducted 
by the US Army and its South Vietnamese counterpart (Nightswonger, in Johnson, 2001, 
p. 71). 
By 1968, the CORDS program encompassed diverse sub-programs to regain the 
support of the population as well as of the country. To accomplish this goal, the key 
element of the program was the establishment of village-defense forces – the original 
concept of the Regional Forces or Popular Forces, but developed as territorial security 
forces. However, the refusal of the US Army to entirely support this program, shaped the 
nature of its offensive operation. By January 1969, 278 new Regional Force companies 
were authorized by CORDS; however, this time for offensive action (Adams, 1998, p. 
100). 
Even though by 1967 CORDS had achieved significant success in negating 
popular support to the Vietcong, a change of strategy on the side of the insurgents, as a 
consequence of the enormous toll paid during the “Tet offensive” in January 1968, 
diminished the US previous achievements. The North Vietnamese command increasingly 
started to rely on main force regulars, leaving the Vietcong as a guerrilla distraction to 
disperse the South Vietnamese Army (Maechling, in Johnson, 2001, pp. 71--72). Under 
this new situation, the US approach also changed. General Abrams instituted small-unit 
operations in cooperation with South Vietnamese forces and local para-military units; 
nevertheless, this effort was too little too late. By then, the Maoist communists had 
shifted to the third phase of their program; the phase of conventional mobile warfare. At 
this point the very impact of “Tet” was felt by the United States’ audience. The apparent 
US defeat in Vietnam had a big effect over US policymakers and public opinion. The 
alternatives available for the Nixon Administration were either to escalate the war with 
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the risk of a Soviet or Chinese intervention, or a withdrawal the US troops from Vietnam. 
In March 29, 1973, the last US troops left Vietnam. 
 
D. THE CIVILIAN IRREGULAR DEFENSE GROUP 
For the communists in Vietnam, it was of great importance to turn the passive 
acceptance of the rural population into active support. On the other hand, the purpose of 
the South Vietnam government was to prevent or reverse the National Liberation Front’s 
influence among the rural, village-dwelling farmers who made up the bulk of the South 
Vietnamese population (Adams, 1998, p. 81).  Under these circumstances the 
Government of South Vietnam began to organize the countryside. The original idea to 
resettle a village came from a provincial chief in the Can-Tho area who faced the 
difficulty of retaining control of the rural population (Osborne, 1965, p. 21). With this 
initiative, the Saigon government envisioned two solutions; one was to relocate the 
threatened population into protected areas, the other was to protect the villages in their 
original position. 
In the case of Vietnam, both solutions were intimately related with the use of 
Local-Defenses as an essential element to protect the new and old villages from the 
insurgents’ attacks and influence. By 1959 the South Vietnamese government opted for 
the first solution and started to implement resettlement plans (Osborne, 1965, p. 21). The 
first initiative in the resettlement programs was the “agroville” program.  Under this 
scheme a number of hamlets’ inhabitants were forced to abandon their lands and to 
consolidate together in a newly constructed central village. As mentioned by a key 
official in the program, it was a military strategy to improve security but ignored the 
economic and social implications of the relocation (Adams, 1998, p.82). Ironically, the 
program was able to severely affect the Vietcong influence in the affected areas, in that it 
increased the resentment and hate of the displaced populations against the South 
Vietnamese government. 
The US reaction to this situation, which was benefiting the Vietcong, was to 
persuade Saigon to cut the agroville program in favor of a CIA plan to create support 
among the rural population. According to this plan, the Civilian Irregular Defense Group 
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(CIDG) was created in 1961. The concept of the program was also to deny Vietcong 
influence within the countryside; however, it took a different approach. The new 
initiative stressed the need to arm and to train the population in order for them to act in 
their own defense. At the same time it stressed the need of minimizing the displacement 
of people away from their land. 
The CIDG program, although created by the CIA, was to be implemented by the 
US Army Special Force. In November 1961 the first of 26 ‘A’ teams arrived to Vietnam 
to execute the program (Adams, 1998, p.84). Each 12-man Special Forces ‘A’ team was 
expected to establish an area development center at the district level and train a little over 
a thousand people as village-defense militia. In addition, each development center was 
organized with Camp Strike Forces – between 300 and 400 full time CIDG soldiers, who 
performed as a reaction force against attacks. The CIDG units also performed intensive 
patrolling within the vicinity of their village, as well as developed communal projects 
within their villages. An important assessment of the Special Forces units was the 
integration of the defense forces into the intelligence network; the collection of detailed 
and systematic information on the National Liberation Front and the Vietcong was of 
great importance to identify and capture communist cadres. Other simultaneous programs 
provided by the Special Forces included civil affair programs to improve sanitation, 
water production, agriculture, and medic assistance. On an elementary level the program 
was supported with psychological operations. 
In the early 60’s, the Montagnards, a minority tribe of the South Vietnamese, who 
lived in the highlands and remote lowland districts of the Mekong Delta, were included 
as part of the CIDG program. However at the beginning of the program, these tribes were 
left behind by the Saigon government. Later on the need to control the highlands 
reinforced the idea of their inclusion and training by the Special Forces (Kelly, 1972, pp. 
19 - 20). The US Special Forces liked the rugged, self-sufficient Montagnards and found 
that they quickly developed into effective, resourceful soldiers (Adams, 1998, p. 85). 
An important example on the effectiveness of the CIDG program is under the 
Buon Enao experiment. Under this experiment, the Rhade, the most influential and 
strategically located of the Montagnards tribes was approached, organized, armed, and 
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trained by US Special Forces. The proposition required their unconditional support to the 
South Vietnamese government as well as their participation in the village self defense 
program. After the first approach by a representative of the US Embassy and a Special 
Forces Sergeant, the villagers agreed to support the government. The first actions carried 
out were the construction of a fence to enclose Buon Enao, the construction of shelter for 
women and children, the construction of housing for a training center, and the 
establishment of an intelligence system to control movement into the village and provide 
early warning of attack. By December 1961, all constructions and fortifications, as well 
as training and preparation, were completed by the Buon Enao villagers. At this point, the 
chiefs of the village publicly stated that from then on no Vietcong would enter their 
village or receive assistance of any kind. (Kelly, 1972, p. 25). After local security 
systems and a strike forces were established in Buon Enao, proving their effectiveness to 
isolate the guerrillas, the program was extended to forty other Rhade villages located 
within a radius of ten to fifteen kilometers. The Special Forces A detachments assisted in 
training village defenders and village medics, as well as other villagers, to support civic 
assistance programs such as planting, care of crops, and construction. The logistics and 
operational aspects of the program were initially handled by the US Army Special Forces. 
By August 1962, the program in Buon Enao had a major acceptance within the 
population. At this point, 200 villages and almost 60,000 people within the Darlac 
Province were organized and protected on this basis. By the end of 1962 the Darlac 
Province was declared secure. 
Later on, despite its success, the program lost support. On the one hand, the ‘big 
unit’ mentality of the US Army began to change the original concept of village defense 
units into the concept of strike forces. They also began to fight as conventional infantry, 
seeking out enemy units for attack (Operations Report, in Adams, 1998, p. 87). On the 
other hand, as the US Special Forces were gradually turning over the program to the 
government of South Vietnam would transfer the CIDG militia - recruited with defensive 
purpose – to other locations with offensive missions, displacing them from their land and 
territory with no economic retribution. The territorial militia, empowered with the 
knowledge of their region and motivated with the idea of protecting their home, lost 
 40
much of their effectiveness. By April 1964, with the militarization of the program and the 
impossibility of the Special Forces commanders to return to their original concept, almost 
none of the village defenses were trained. By then, many villages had abandoned the 
concept and again became vulnerable to the Vietcong’s attacks and influence. In 1965 
almost all CIDG defense units were transformed to light conventional units. All the 
previous success was just an illusion. 
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The ultimate victory of the Peruvian government over the terrorist organization 
and insurgent forces of the “Sendero Luminoso” (Shining Path, SL) in the 1980-97 was 
not marked by a single conventional military battle between the Armed forces and the 
SL. It was the combination of military actions, the capture of SL leadership, and the 
utilization of a relatively unknown, outside Peru, grassroots peasant organization that 
helped turn back the tide and defeat the vicious insurgency that haunted Peru for decades. 
 
A. PRECONDITIONS 
Peru in the early 1990s was an impoverished, crisis-prone country trying to cope 
with major societal, economic, and political changes. Peru is the fourth largest country in 
Latin America, ranking after Brazil, Argentina, and Mexico; it has an area of about 1.28 
million square km. (496,225 sq. mi.), three times larger than California (State, 2004). 
Peru has three distinct regions; the Costa, the Sierra and the Amazon.  The Andean range 
runs through the country from north to south, separating the coast from the jungle, and 
forming the Sierra region – the most underdeveloped region in the country. The Costa 
constitutes only 11% of the country's territory, but has about half the population of 25 
million mainly concentrated around Lima, the capitol city.  It contains the most 
productive agricultural lands and the bulk of the industry, also mainly centered on Lima. 
The Peruvian population is ethnically composed by Amerindians 45%, mixed 
Amerindians and Whites (Mestizo) 37%, White 15%, Black, Chinese, Japanese, and 
others 3%.  Peru has two official languages--Spanish and the foremost indigenous 
language, Quechua, which is mainly spoken in the Sierra region. Spanish is used by the 
government, and in education and commerce (State, 2004). 
Peru’s diverse terrain includes lifeless deserts; teeming rain forests; precipitous 
valleys; and high, windswept plains, resulting in large natural obstacles for movement 
through out the country. Peru’s transportation infrastructure compared to its land size is 
minuscule, making most of the country isolated and secluded. Peru’s road system had a 
total of 69,942 kilometers in 1991. Road maintenance is haphazard and substandard. A 
chronic lack of funds for road repair and construction has led to deterioration and, in 
places, disappearance of Peru's land transport infrastructure. Most of the high Sierra 
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roads are narrow, un-surfaced, and subject to frequent landslides. Waterways in many 
parts of the country, especially in the Amazon basin, which consist of 60% of the nation’s 
territory, are a formidable barrier to penetrate. With the limited, under-maintained road 
and the relatively sparse river systems of Peru, movement throughout the country 
especially in the Sierras and Amazon region is very difficult if not impossible to the 
majority of the county (Peru, 2004). In addition to the lack of land and water 
transportation infrastructure, Peru has additional geographical challenges with its borders. 
Peru has five countries that border it national territory, Bolivia 900 km, Brazil 1,560 km, 
Chile 160 km, Colombia 1,496 km (est.), Ecuador 1,420 km each with its own 
challenges. In addition, the remoteness and under-manned Peruvian borders have been 
very accessible and permeable for the ever-growing drug-trafficking and insurgency 
problems across its borders, particularly with Colombia and Brazil (Land Boundary, 
2004). 
In addition to its geographical and ethnic diversity, Peru experienced economic 
disparity in the 1970-80’s, especially in remote areas of the country. The most affected 
departments in the country were the one’s located in the Sierra region; in particular the 
department of Ayacucho. With very little governmental assistance to mitigate the 
growing economical disparity this department was one of the most affected of all; 
Illiteracy stood at 68.5%, infant morality rate was 12.8%, the highest in the world, and 
life expectancy was only 51 years, among the lowest in the country (Klarén, 2000, p. 
370). Ayacucho’s economical disparity spawned a strong resentment against the capital 
and insurgency organizations found a base of supporters that were dissatisfied with the 
current economic and political situation in Peru. In 1990 the Ayacucho Department was 
still one of the most sparsely populated (with less than 3 percent of the country's 
population, mostly Quechua-speaking Amerindians) and economically deprived 
departments in Peru. 
The increase in student organizations had occurred in conjunction with the 
curbing of financing for universities and the shrinking of economic opportunities for 
university graduates, which had resulted in a radicalization of the university community 
in general. Thus, many universities increasingly had become havens for frustration. The 
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extreme manifestation of this phenomenon was the birth and growth of the SL in the 
University of Huamanga (Universidad de Huamanga) in Ayacucho in the 1970s. Abimael 
Guzmán Reynoso, a professor at the university and eventually director of personnel, was 
the founder and leader of the SL. The SL virtually controlled the university for several 
years, and students were indoctrinated in the Marxist-Leninist-Maoist philosophy. The 
university trained students, mainly from the Ayacucho area, primarily in education; but a 
degree from Huamanga was considered inferior to the Lima universities, and students had 
few opportunities other than returning to their hometowns to teach or driving taxis. As 
jobs for graduates were few and far between, becoming an active militant in the SL 
provided a sense of belonging and a sense of optimism for many university students and 
graduates (State, 2004). 
The democratic election of 1980 was intended to symbolize Peru's return to 
civilian governance and democracy after more than a decade of military rule. But the SL, 
committed to armed struggle, chose the eve of the very election to initiate a rebellion 
against the Peruvian state by burning ballot boxes in the town of Chuschis in Ayacucho. 
The SL revolution began immediately following a decade of sweeping agrarian reform 
and nationalization of industry carried out by General Juan Velasco Alvarado and the 
Revolutionary Government of the Armed Forces, which decreed a sweeping and 
immediate land reform, ending serfdom and private latifundios.  Velasco’s reform was 
seriously flawed; it affected nearly 60% of the country’s agricultural lands. When it was 
finally completed, half of all arable land had been transferred to an estimated 375,000 
families (one quarter of the rural population). However, all these families did not 
benefited equally from the reform. Peasants on more prosperous coastal estates (10% of 
all peasants) benefited substantially, while their counterparts in the less-developed 
highlands (Sierras) gained little or nothing from the reforms. It was among the latter that 
support developed for the SL. Moreover, the reform left out an estimated 1 million 
seasonal workers (Klarén, 2000), which caused widespread disillusionment and 
dissatisfaction among peasants towards the official land reform and its administrators. 
Hence, despite the continuing problems of poverty and economic crisis, the turn of the 
decade was ripe for armed revolution (Fumerton, 2000). 
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During President Belaunde´s second Government (1980-1985), severe economic 
problems left over from the military governments persisted; Belaunde's popularity eroded 
under the stress of inflation, economic hardship, and terrorism. During the 1980s, 
cultivation of illicit coca was established in large areas on the eastern Andean slope. 
Rural terrorism by the SL and the Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA) 
increased during this time and derived significant financial support from their alliances 
with the narcotraffickers. The rate of inflation went from 59 percent in 1980 to 163 
percent by 1985 (Hudson, 2004). By 1982 the SL had gained control of an estimated 85% 
of Ayacucho. The SL demonstrated its increasing power in March of 1982, when they 
made a spectacular attack on the main prison in Ayacucho and liberated dozens of 
Senderistas prisoners (Klarén, 2000, p. 380). Growing signs of the SL success finally 
prompted President Belaunde, in December 1982, to suspend constitutional guarantees, 
declare a state of emergency, and place the department of Ayacucho under complete 
military control. Before then President Belaunde had been slow to react to the threat of 
the SL, defining the guerrilla movement as simply a criminal organization. “He 
misdiagnosed the group for some time as petty bandits, then insisted on linking the SL to 
international guerrilla support networks, and finally was convinced that a military 
response alone would suffice” (Palmer, 1992, p. 13). After presiding over a free election, 
Belaunde turned the presidency over to Alan García Pérez. (Democratic Rule, 2004). By 
then, the SL had grown considerably and enjoyed great popular support. 
Economic mismanagement by the Garcia administration (1985-90) led to 
hyperinflation from 1988 to 1990.  Concerned about the economy, the increasing terrorist 
threat from SL, and allegations of official corruption, voters chose a relatively unknown 
mathematician-turned-politician, Alberto Fujimori, as president in 1990. Fujimori 
implemented drastic orthodox measures that caused inflation to drop from 7,650% in 
1990 to 139% in 1991. Faced with opposition to his reform efforts, Fujimori dissolved 
Congress in the "auto-coup" of April 5, 1992. He then revised the constitution; called 
new congressional elections; and implemented substantial economic reform, including 
privatization of numerous state-owned companies, creation of a more investment-friendly 
climate, and much improved management of the economy (State, 2004). 
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B. INSURGENCY STRATEGY 
The political identity presented by the Shining Path (SL) to perpetrate its violent 
actions against the Peruvian population in the 1980’s and 90’s had its roots in Marxist, 
Leninist, and Maoist ideology. Guzman’s movement addressed the Peruvian society “as 
semi-feudal and semi-colonial and proclaimed that all communists had to adhere to the 
revolutionary violence” (Jimenez, 2000, p. 30).  Guzman took the lead redefining the 
Peruvian Communist Party (PCP).  After many debates and struggles within the PCP to 
define the ideological line to be taken to conduct the revolution, in 1970 the Communist 
Party “Sendero Luminoso” was founded in the Peruvian city of Ayacucho. The SL 
applied Mao Tse Tung’s theory; in which the concept of popular war supported by the 
peasantry, and the creation of a Popular Guerrilla Army, would be the means to 
“surround the cities from the countryside” (Desco, 1989, p. 275) in order to seize power. 
Especially in the first years of the struggle, the new ideology adopted by the SL would 
mark their modus operandi; their way to organize, to recruit supporters, and to select their 
targets. Following the new Marxist-Leninist-Maoist-Pensamiento-Gonzalo ideology, in 
1980, the SL left its clandestine activities of indoctrination and proselytism within 
universities in Ayacucho to initiate the first of three phases to challenge the government: 
the phase of “strategic defense”. In this phase, also called “revolving the countryside,” 
the intention of the SL was to legitimate their targets in the eyes of the peasant population 
in order to gain support and commitment by portraying themselves as the saviors of an 
archaic state. 
The SL proclaimed the existence of an obsolete state; therefore, their political 
goal was to replace the existing state with the new “Popular Republic of Peru” (Jimenez, 
2000, p. 80).  Since their goal was to replace the “old obsolete state”, their main attacks at 
the beginning of the offensive were directed to public infrastructures and governmental 
authorities; especially National Police deputies. To justify their attacks and avoid any 
constrains, the targets were portrayed as traitors and as part of the “bourgeois state”. A 
secondary intention was to capture the weapons of their victims, as well as to replace the 
“old” authorities with their own cadres. The latter were the means to establish control and 
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organize the population in what they called “Popular Support Committees” or bases. A 
common practice in order to invoke admiration and support of the rural population was to 
carry out what they called “summary trials”.  In these trials, the “bad authorities” as well 
as the “traitors” were judged and executed in front of the inhabitants of the villages 
visited by the SL. Sometimes the family and friend of the victims would also pay for the 
“offense”. However in the first years of the struggle, this methodology produced good 
results in gathering weapons and gaining important support of the Andean societies, latter 
on, the indiscriminate use of violence against the population and miscalculation would 
produce a negative effect on the image of the SL. 
During the early 80’s the SL inaccurately failed to predict the reaction of peasants 
attached to their land.  At the beginning, the offer of the SL seemed quite attractive to the 
peasants; later on, as the SL begins to extend its operations to other provinces, which 
required moving along with its supporters, the attractiveness to join declined 
considerably. The peasantry had no intentions of moving from and abandoning their 
lands.  According to Desco (1989), “the peasantry felt like a tool to be sacrificed for the 
development of the urban campaign” (p. 285). To counteract the lack of support in the 
rural areas, the SL increases the targeting of military authorities and troops in Ayacucho 
in 1982. Their intention was to create contradiction by provoking military repression 
against the population in order to polarize the masses in their favor. Although at first this 
strategy proved to be positive for the terrorist movement, by 1983 the peasant 
communities of Ayacucho, organized by the Armed Forces into Auto Defense 
Organizations (CAD), strongly rejected the SL’s proposal, initiating the main reasons 
why the SL, without counting on an important rural support, prematurely moves to the 
jungle and extended its violent activities over the cities. 
By 1985, the lack of support in the countryside as well as the pressure exerted by 
the armed forces in the rural areas divided the terrorist organization in two fronts: the 
terrorist columns which operated in the Andean range and jungle, and the terrorist cells 
operating in the cities.  According to Guzman, “the second stage, called the stage of 
“Strategic Consolidation and Preparation for the Counter Offensive” (Strategic 
Equilibrium Phase) initiated on December 1990” (Guzman, 2000, p. 123). In this stage, 
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the SL’s new legitimate targets included foreign representatives and corporations, public 
and private properties, military and police infrastructure, opinion leaders, military elites, 
as well as media infrastructure and opposition press.  At this point, the frequent setbacks 
on the countryside became a major concern for the SL and were translated in 
indiscriminate violence against the urban population in order to maintain their “victors” 
image. Moreover, the excessive use of violence in the cities – especially in the capital of 
Lima – as well as the killing of non combatants, created a climate of fear and doubt in the 
Peruvian society, expressed by massive exodus of the population to foreign countries. 
Raúl González, a Senderologist, has noted that the SL began making Lima the focus of its 
terrorism in 1991 only after having lost in the countryside. The SL no longer fitted its 
original Robin Hood-like mandate and ultimately began fighting the local grassroots 
organizations-- such as neighborhood committees, Rondas Compesinas and Auto Defense 
Organizations (González & Palmer, 2004). 
In 1992, after the capture of Guzman with his closest collaborators, the declining 
process of the organization increased exponentially. In 1993, after the letter of 
capitulation signed by Abimael Guzman, the conditions for the remaining militants in the 
field changed dramatically. The number of violent acts in Lima decreased considerably 
and the main operational theater for the SL returned to the jungle. At this point, alliances 
with the narco-traffickers operating in the Peruvian jungle became the major source of 
income for the terrorist group, as well as their only mean of survivability; situation that 
continues today with a remaining SL faction in the northeast jungle. 
 
C. THE COUNTERINSURGENCY STRATEGY 
The counterinsurgency strategy applied by the Peruvian government during the 
early years of the struggle was mainly limited to the military arena. Furthermore, during 
these years, not even the enemy had been clearly identified by the government; thus the 
response was misperceived and inadequate. There was no clear chain of command and 
unified management of the war. Since the government of Belaunde (1980-1985) and 
Garcia (1985-1990) did not consider the violent activities of the SL and MRTA as real 
threats to national security, there was no real intention of either governments to confront 
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the insurgency in other fields rather than the military. As expressed by the Director of the 
Center for Military Studies of the 80’s, General Jarama: “Guzman (leader of the SL) was 
playing a chess game while we were playing a tennis game, with other uniforms and 
equipment” (Kruijt, 1996). At this point, each military institution and the police, who at 
the same time were trying to achieve their own goals, conducted the war individually. 
By 1982, with the intervention of the Peruvian armed forces in Ayacucho and the 
armed forces’ recognition of the insurgent threat, the military begins to shape a 
counterinsurgency strategy to confront the SL. Under this scheme, in 1983, the Peruvian 
Navy and Marine Corps begins to organize local defense organizations or Rondas 
Campesinas in Huanta – Ayacucho. The intention was to provide protection to the rural 
communities and to extend the government’s control over the region. Other military 
branches, aware of the need to first pacify the rural areas in order to undertake 
complementary programs to regain the support of the population, followed this initiative 
in their areas of responsibility. Unfortunately, these programs did not receive much 
attention from the central government, nor there was politic decision to support them. 
Nevertheless, it is important to mention that between 1993 and 1989 civic action 
programs, psychological operations, and the Rondas Campesinas or Auto Defense 
organizations supported by the armed forces, enjoyed some success in confronting and 
isolating the insurgents in many rural communities of the Peruvian Sierra’s. 
In 1990, the new administration realizes that the only way to rule the country and 
improve the economic conditions was to stop terrorism by combining the efforts of all 
government institutions and social spheres.  After a long learning process, the decision 
makers and politics finally realized that the military was right in defending the idea that 
the solution to the insurgent problem was not exclusively military, but had a strong 
component of non-military measures. Furthermore, the government realized that the 
country needed the involvement of all the population to confront the threat and a major 
effort in intelligence to attack the core of the SL. 
In 1992, the new administration, unable to govern, dissolved the congress and was 
then able to organize a counterinsurgency strategy by redefining and reinforcing the 
previous attempts, as well as by innovating with new approaches and laws.  From 1992 
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on, the Peruvian government developed a combined and multifaceted effort to defeat the 
SL. The strategy of the government can be basically addressed in six different but related 
fronts. 1) The unification of all military commands which allowed for a single national 
military strategy to be developed and implemented with the National Police subordinated 
to the Armed Forces in each area and the senior officer of each military detachment 
assumed the Civil – Military Command of each location. 2) Disorganization of the 
Popular Support Committees: Special Operations Detachments had the mission of doing 
field intelligence and disorganizing the “Comites Populares” (Popular Committees) 
organized by the SL in each village. Their mission was accomplished by capturing either 
the military, politic, or logistic command of the village and their communications system, 
penetrating the intelligence network, and finding and destroying the weapons and food 
supplies hidden for the arrival of the terrorist columns. 3) Reliance on Intelligence: the 
importance given to intelligence on the terrorist organizations was the major achievement 
of the government. A new conception of intelligence encouraged the different 
intelligence agencies to share information between them. The creation of the GEIN 
(Special intelligence Group of the National Police) – which later on would capture 
Abimael Guzman and other important top leaders of the SL and the MRTA, was also 
instrumental. 4) Antiterrorist Legislation and Psychological Operations: the Peruvian 
government created new antiterrorist laws increasing penalties for terrorist crimes - 
including the establishment of life imprisonment - and defined terrorist activities as 
national betrayal, which gave special powers to the Military Justice to investigate and 
judge accused terrorists. The measure was taken due to the incapacity of the judicial 
system to properly judge and convict accused terrorist, as well as to protect civilian 
judges from menace and assassination by the insurgents. The new anti terrorist law also 
included the “repent law” and the “law of effective collaboration”. Both laws had great 
psychological impact on the population. By the end of the struggle, the repent law had 
stimulated more than 5000 militants of the SL to desert and the law of effective 
collaboration provided important information to the government to capture other 
militants. Both laws benefited the defectors and collaborators with the reduction of 
penalties, absolution, and pardon.  5) Recovery of the Population: To improve the civil 
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state relations, the government developed “civil actions” campaigns in the most remote 
locations of the country. During these social activities, food, clothes and medicines were 
given to the population, as well as medical treatment and other resources such as books, 
construction materials, agriculture machinery, and transportation facilities. Adding to this 
goal was the gradual improvement of the economic situation in the country. The 
development of government projects financed by external investment and the 
improvement of public services such as electricity, roads, water, and telephonic 
connections - especially in the rural areas - played an important role in gaining popular 
support and negating the influence of the SL. 6) Reorganization of the Rondas 
Campesinas (Night Watch Patrols); a relatively unknown, out side Peru, grassroots 
peasant organization. 
 
D. RONDAS CAMPESINAS (NIGHT WATCH PATROLS) 
The reorganization and reshaping of the existing peasant communities into Auto 
Defense Committees or Rondas Campesinas, during the war against terror between 1980 
and 1997, was a key element for the final success of the Peruvian counterinsurgency 
strategy. 
The peasant communities exist in Peru from times immemorial. Some rural and 
isolated communities in the need to provide security and protection against common 
thieves and cattle rustlers were forced to organize communal organizations within their 
villages. However, the first documented effort in this direction dates as of December of 
1976 in the hamlet of Cuyumalca, in northern Peru. In this occasion, the organization of 
the Rondas Campesinas was a response of the community to the constant robbery of the 
local school. (Giltlitz and Rojas, 1983, p. 178). Days after a school break in, a prosperous 
peasant who was also the local Teniente-Gobernador (Police Lieutenant Governor), 
named Oblitas, called a communal assembly and suggested the first vigilante committee.  
The peasants responded to the suggestion that the idea extended to the entire hamlet 
(Faundez, 2003, p. 24). The following day Oblitas notified the Sub-Perfect of the 
province of the formation of the Rondas.  On January 6th 1977, the Sub-Perfect signed an 
official decree authorizing the Nocturnal Rondas, whose aim was to guard the 
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community against robberies. By 1978, the Rondas had largely succeeded in controlling 
theft in Cajamarca. Their success enhanced their legitimacy and prompted the 
establishment of Rondas Campesinas in other rural departments. Thus, Rondas soon 
emerged in the Departments of Piura, San Martín, Amazonas, Junín and Ancash. By 
1991, Rondas Campesinas had become the most popular grassroots organization in Peru. 
They covered nearly 3,500 hamlets in Northern Peru, over an area of 150,000 square 
kilometers (Faundez, 2003, p. 24). 
On 21 January 1983, an armed column of seven guerrillas entered a hamlet in 
Huaychao, in the highland sub-region of Huanta province known as Iquicha.  The 
guerrillas judged and summarily executed the Huaychao's Assembly president and the 
lieutenant governor. After the execution grim-faced villagers encircled the guerrillas and 
killed the seven guerrillas with machetes and knives. It was the first time since the SL 
began its insurgency that peasants demonstrated their willingness to defend themselves, 
and their way of life, from guerrilla claims and domination (Fumerton, 2000, p. 1).  
Along with the other grievances, the increase in the number of executions and 
assassinations of common peasants and peasant leaders caused substantial, widespread 
resentment towards the guerrillas, particularly among the victims' relatives. 
During the early years of the war, peasants’ relationship with SL was 
characterized by a strategy of coexistence; that is, an ambiguous posture regarding the 
potential benefits the guerrillas offered and a willingness to wait and see if the insurgent 
promises consisted of more than mere words. However, this relationship deteriorated 
rapidly due to the authoritarian practices and lethal violence of the insurgents. Many 
communities institutionalized defense activities in their Rondas Campesinas. The 
trajectory of the Rondas varied from region to region and, frequently, from community to 
community. However, initially the Rondas were headed by existing communal authorities 
and within the framework of established organizational structures. Rural communities 
thus realized that any chance they had of survival lay in grouping together in multi 
communal hamlets in order to offer each other much-needed protection. 
On August 1984, eight thousand peasants met with General Huamán in Vinchos 
to express their support for the military's counterinsurgency effort, by demonstrating that 
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they had organized in Rondas Campesinas. Five days later, twenty thousand peasants in 
Ocros and Concepción declared in a document that they too had organized a Frente de 
Defensa Civil (Desco, 1989, p.110). The state eventually recognized that it could never 
defeat the Shining Path without the willing support and assistance of the local population. 
President Fujimori’s administration enlisted the Rondas in its campaign against the SL 
and the MRTA. The government had promoted the establishment of Self-Defense 
Committees (Comités de Autodefensa, CAD) in some localities, as part of its war against 
the SL and the MRTA. These were community organizations organized and armed by the 
military and aimed mainly at supporting the military campaign against terrorism. The 
Government and its supporters also referred to these organizations as Rondas 
Campesinas. 
In 1991, the new administration authorized the distribution of large quantities of 
shotguns to the organized Rondas Campesinas. Responsibility for defending the bulk of 
the rural civilian population was thus passed into the hands of the peasants themselves. 
Moreover, the Peruvian peasantry's participation in the counterinsurgency campaign was 
officially acknowledged by the promulgation of Legislative Decree No.741 in 1991, 
which legally recognized the existence of armed rural militias: the CAD. In an ironic 
twist of fate, the very masses for whom the SL had superficially launched a “people’s 
war” had turned against them. The Peruvian government had passed legislation, which 
explicitly placed civilian self-defense committees under the direct control of the Armed 
Forces. The state attempted to regulate the delegation of the legitimate use of force by the 
CAD’s. The state wanted to limit the lethal capability of such groups. Law, Article 4, 
Chapter II of Decreto Legislativo 741, limited self-defense organizations to shotguns as 
the weapons their members were entitled to possess. 
CAD commanders were obliged to report weekly to local military or police 
commanders to update them on all their latest activities and observations in the 
countryside. The military leaders would make periodic surprise inspections of the CAD’s 
within the area of their jurisdiction. The military kept a detailed register of the quantity 
and types of firearms and ammunition in the possession of CAD’s. In 1997, the military 
began to compile a record in the departments of Ayacucho and Huancavelica of every 
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peasant Rondero, which included every rural adult, male or female, between the ages of 
18 and 60 (Fumerton, 2000, p. 19). The military also took a digital photograph of every 
Rondero, which was then stored in a computer database. This detailed personal data was 
necessary for the military to have so that it could eventually issue obligatory 
identification cards to every Rondero in the emergency zone. The identification cards had 
two primary purposes:  to help prevent rebel infiltration of the CAD’s and to have a 
record of each Rondero, so that it would become easier for the state to make indemnity 
payments to the families of those killed or wounded in the line of duty. 
Anthropologist Carlos Iván Degregori Caso has described the Rondas as the 
Fujimori government's biggest success in the counterinsurgency war. By March 1992, 
more than 11,000 rifles and shotguns had been distributed among the 200,000 members 
of 526 officially registered Rondas organizations and Fujimori’s government began 
handing out arms to newly created, ronda-like, urban self-defense groups as well  
(Exploitz, 2004). On September of that same year, the government, also using the Rondas 
as a model, provided about 1,400 shotguns to the Asháninka, the biggest ethnic minority 
in Peru's Amazonian region and the main target of SL terrorism (Exploitz, 2004). In 
1993, all the margins of the Tambo River, which in earlier years suffered constant attacks 
and infiltration from the SL, were well organized and armed using the Ronda model in 
order to confront the SL. Since then the Amazonian region never was attacked by the SL. 
As part of the counter insurgency strategy in the region, the military patrolled the river 
systems and initiated civic action programs, which solidified the population’s support for 
the government, enhanced intelligence collections, and denied the SL freedom of 




VI. ANALYSIS OF CASE STUDIES 
This chapter will analyze the cases selected in the previous four chapters. The 
intent is to identify and summarize the most critical variables affecting the success or 
failure of the local defense program in the four countries. Though no single variable may 
be cited as the full cause for the local defense organizations’ contribution to the overall 
counterinsurgency strategy, it has to be observed that the concept of local defenses in 
these four countries was not conceived by the strategists as an isolated effort of the state 
to counter the insurgents; in practice, however, and for some of the countries, an 
oversight of the variables, a conventional mindset, and a military-focus approach to the 
insurgent problem reduced dramatically the concept’s effectiveness by trying to 
implement it as an isolated initiative. 
Of the cases selected six critical variables have been identified as affecting the 
effectiveness of the program: Geography, Timing, Culture and Traditions, 
Counterinsurgency Strategy, Economy, and Government Commitment. 
 
A. GEOGRAPHY 
When referring to geography we will refer to terrain, accessibility, and means of 
communication as well. In the implementation and development of the local defense 
program geography played an important role on both the cause of the state and that of the 
insurgents. In most cases geography was one of the causes limiting the accessibility of 
the state to assist and support isolated rural populations, as well as to reinforce local 
defense organizations when attacked by guerrilla columns. At the same time, and in most 
of the cases, geography provided safe heavens for the insurgents to conceal, plan and 
reorganize, as well as to infiltrate within the rural villages. In all cases, at the beginning 
of the struggle, geography benefited the insurgent cause by providing them with easy 
access to rural populations were there was little control by the state or no control at all. 
The lack of means of communications such as roads, airports, navigable rivers, telephone 
lines, and television and radio stations limited even more the control and influence of the 
state and increased the advantage for the insurgents. Under these circumstances, the 
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insurgents were free to fill in the vacuum left by the state and to gain support of the 
population. 
In Malaya the MCP did not have this advantage.  The fact that Malaya is a small 
peninsula allowed better control of its borders, diminishing the strength of the guerrillas 
by restricting the flow of external support, which at the same time allowed a better 
allocation of government forces, easy access to the rural population, and a major support 
to the home defense program. Despite the dense vegetation and moderate mountains in 
the country, a good road and communications system increased the capacity of the armed 
forces and police to quickly assist and reinforce the local communities; thus extending 
the presence and authority of the state on the rural areas. 
An important asset of the Malayan counterinsurgency strategy was to reorganize 
its armed forces and police, as well as the home defenses, by mimicking the territorial 
organization of the MCP. Under this scheme, civil and military officials were appointed 
at the district level to administrate and support civil-military relations, including the 
training, equipment, and control of the home defenses. Furthermore, the initial advantage 
that the guerrillas had, due to their easy access to Chinese squatters, was countered by the 
Malayan government by implementing the resettlement programs; which were intimately 
related to the home defense organizations as a source of protection for the new villages. 
Despite the negative effect that these programs had at the beginning due to the attachment 
of the Chinese to their land, eventually compensatory measures for the inhabitants and 
trustful home guard protection released security forces to be allocated in small units to 
confront the guerrillas in the jungle. A policy of minimum displacement and 
implementation of home defenses among indigenous Chinese, Malay, and Indian 
squatters also helped in this endeavor. 
Vietnam was quiet different. A country one and a half times bigger than Malaya, 
including a land frontier of more than 3,000 miles with Laos, Cambodia, China, and 
North Vietnam, as well as an extended coast line increased the strength of the Vietcong 
by facilitating the flow of weapons and logistics to its guerrillas. The tropical weather, 
characterize by rainy seasons, produced a dense jungle – less dense than the Malayan, but 
more homogeneously distributed throughout the country - which was difficult to 
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penetrate and complicated the assistance of the government to indigenous populations 
and civil defenses. Compared to Malaya, many populated areas in Vietnam were 
inaccessible and much more separated from each other. For instance, by 1996, 75% of the 
roads in Vietnam were unpaved, making the waterways - the Mekong Delta River -the 
most important mean of communications. 
During the Vietnam War, the communications system was precarious and limited 
even more the support provided to the civil defense program. The geographical barriers 
and the lack of communication - necessary to permanently assist remote and isolated 
populations, and to increase government presence, control, and legitimacy - diminished 
the appeal of the civil defense organizations and shifted the support of the populace to the 
Vietcong. However, the success of the Buon Enao experiment proved that geography and 
accessibility were important but not essential in Vietnam. What started as a small-scale 
experiment in December 1961, turned to be, a year later, a program in which 200 
indigenous villages - strategically located - were organized in civil defenses to provide 
their own security.  Unfortunately, after this partial success the program was 
marginalized for other military options. 
In El Salvador geography played a role for both the insurgents and the state. 
Despite the extended land frontiers with Guatemala and Honduras, as well as the 
proximity to the Gulf of Fonseca in Nicaragua - which facilitated the flow of external 
support to the guerrillas, the insurgents in El Salvador were limited in their scope. El 
Salvador, being one of the smallest and more highly dense populated countries in the 
world, with relatively few remote areas, did not provide the guerrillas with many 
locations in which to hide - except for northern Chalatenango, Morazan, and the San 
Vicente volcano. However, later on, this operational limitation was overcome by the 
guerrillas as they easily assimilated into the rural communities without drawing much 
attention (Sheehan, 1989, p. 130). On the other hand, the dense vegetation in the El 
Salvador, the difficult mountain range, and the limitations in the quality and quantity of 
roads and means of communication within the country, made more difficult the feeble 
attempts of the Salvadoran government to establish the local defense organizations. 
Furthermore, due to the difficulties in accessing remote and isolated rural populations 
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without having contact with the enemy, the armed forces and police strongly relied on 
military air transportation, restricting even more the possibilities of organizing the civil 
defenses in the country. In a war that pays a premium for being among the people, the 
UH-1H has made ESAF (El Salvador Armed Forces) into an army that spends too much 
time above the people (Bacevich, 1988, p. 33). 
Peru is a country affected by a very rugged geography. The main geographical 
characteristic differentiating Peru from Malaya, Vietnam, and El Salvador, and the one 
which made more difficult the establishment of local defenses, was the size of the 
country and the Andean range. The latter extends through the country with mountains of 
more than 18,000 feet.  The Andean range separates the coast – unique region of 
economic and social development in the country – from the jungle, consolidating an 
ample and mountainous terrain, sparsely populated and economically and socially 
underdeveloped.  The extended and very dense jungle also provided safe heavens for the 
insurgents to operate and organize, as well as to infiltrate the rural populations. The 
scarce means of communication to properly integrate and assist the sparsely indigenous 
populations in the mountains and jungle, facilitated the recruitment of cadres, as well as 
the attainment of logistic support, on the build-up phase of the insurgency.  The 
underdevelopment and lack of control on the borders – especially with Brazil, Bolivia, 
and Colombia - allowed the insurgents to establish connections with international drug 
cartels and other insurgent organizations, which provided them with economic resources 
and weapons to challenge the government and the population. 
Similar to Malaya, a late but important strategy of the Peruvian government to 
counter the insurgents was to organize the armed forces and police on territorial basis by 
taking advantage of the territorial organization of the Shining Path and the geographic 
conditions. Under this configuration the armed forces were capable of organizing the 
local defenses in indigenous villages, providing them with training and weapons to 
confront the insurgents in their area. Despite the initial failure of the program, in part due 
to the geographical barriers which limited the assistance of the government to the local 
defenses, the armed forces gradually extended their control over the rural areas by 
relaying on the bases of support provided by the local defenses or Ronda Campesina 
 59
organizations. Once the area was safe and protected by the local defenses, the military 
establishment would progress to more conflicting areas. Finally, the insurgents were 
pushed to isolated jungle areas were suffocation operations would be held by the armed 
forces, until their final defeat in 1997. 
In all cases, the geographic conditions that limited the presence of the state in the 
rural areas of the country would be the same conditions affecting the organization and 
performance of the local defenses. However, despite the need to be considered when 
planning the creation of local defenses, geography is not the determinant factor for the 
success or failure of the local defense program. Other factors, analyzed below, also 
influence effectiveness of the program. 
 
B. TIMING 
Under this variable, we will analyze how the timing of the local defense 
program’s inception influenced its effectiveness, as well as how it contributed to the 
overall counterinsurgency strategy. For instance, it must be noted, that the more time a 
government takes to build-up local defense organizations when confronting an 
insurgency, the more time the insurgents have to organize support bases on the rural 
populations, and the more difficult it will be for the government to regain control. 
Despite the long history of the Malayan home guard defenses, which were first 
conceived by indigenous villagers as a source of protection against crime and robbery, 
the new concept of the local defenses as a mean to protect rural populations from the 
insurgents was the initiative of the British Director of Operations in Malaya, Sir Harold 
Briggs in 1950.  By the time Sir Gerald Templer was appointed on November 1951, the 
program already enjoyed complete recognition and was supporting police defensive 
operations in resettle areas or Strategic Hamlets. Considering that the MCP initiated its 
violent activities on June 1948, and despite the early futile attempts of the Malayan 
government to build-up a coherent response, it can be said that the local defense program 
in Malaya began just in time. At that point, the Malayan government was still capable of 
gaining the initiative in the battle for the hearts and minds of the population. 
 60
The case of Peru was somewhat similar. Built-up over the already existing 
concept of the peasant communities (Comunidades Campesinas), the Autodefense 
Commitees (Comites de Autodefensa) or Rondas Campesinas had some delay in their 
reorientation to confront the Peruvian insurgency. Although the SL initiated its violent 
activities beginning 1980, the concept of local defenses did not begin, as a source of 
protection against insurgent organizations, until 1991 and started to materialize as part of 
the government’s strategy to attain popular support and establish control over the 
country. By 1991 the Comites de Autodefensa were officially recognized by the Peruvian 
government. Despite the early efforts displayed by the armed forces and by isolated 
communities to organize and protect their villages against the attacks and influence of 
insurgent organizations, the lack of a national policy to extend the establishment of local 
defenses throughout the territory diminished the effectiveness of the concept. The 
insurgents could always move to influence a new audience. By the end of 1992, the 
Rondas Campesinas had gained certain reputation, and many of the areas of influence 
were under their direct control, requiring a minimal assistance of the armed forces. 
In El Salvador and Vietnam the situations were quiet different. In both cases the 
local defense programs came late. The insurgents had already consolidated their bases of 
support among the rural population and had established a net of information within the 
inhabitants of almost every village. Despite some late and isolated initiatives like the 
Buon Enao experiment in Vietnam and the Salvadoran training school for civil defense 
organizations at San Juan Opico, the local defense program in both countries had a 
hollow achievement. With no timely capacity of the state to protect its own population, 
the control of the country was in the hands of the insurgents. 
The evidence shows that time is an important consideration when planning to 
implement local defense organizations; however, timing not necessarily determined the 
success or failure of the program in these four countries. In some cases like Malaya and 
Peru, the official local defense programs promoted by the government started with some 
delay, thus they proved their effectiveness over time by extending the government’s 
control in the rural areas. It must be noted, however, that there is a turning point in the 
conflict where any initiative of the government to organize the population in local 
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defenses will fail. At that point, as in Vietnam and El Salvador, the insurgents will have 
vast control over the population and regaining the controlled territories will be an arduous 
if not impossible task. 
Based on these observations, it can be said that timing has a direct relation to the 
effectiveness of the local defense program. The earlier the program begins, the more 
possibilities it has to succeed. For instance, in all cases, the implementation of the local 
defense program skipped the subversive phase of the insurgency. In two of the cases, 
Malaya and Peru, the program was reinforced during the guerrilla phase of the 
insurgency, and finally succeeded. In the cases of Vietnam and El Salvador, where the 
local defense programs failed to achieve their purpose, the programs only received high 
attention when the insurgents already had the capacity to challenge the state in 
conventional terms. 
 
C. CULTURE AND TRADITIONS 
The cultural values and traditions of the indigenous populations also affected the 
organization and development of the local defenses. In some cases, the lack of 
consideration of race, language, customs, and religious practices of the inhabitants of an 
indigenous village where the local defense organizations were to be organized, 
diminished the effectiveness of the initiative and eventually turned active and passive 
government supporters into enemies. 
During the Malayan Emergency, the initial lack of consideration for the Chinese 
minority, regarded as communist supporters and aliens by the Malay population, 
presented the Malay government with the challenge to attract the Chinese community to 
its side in order to build up home defenses among the Chinese squatters. To avoid Sino-
Malay racial incidents, great efforts had to be made by the British and Malay 
governments to convince the bulk of the Chinese population that they had the same stakes 
in Malaya as nationals and not as Chinese with the communists (Thompson, 1966, p. 19 - 
20). The lack of knowledge of the Chinese language, as well as the initial exclusion of 
Chinese from the local defense program, had negative effects of building up a trustful 
base of Chinese supporters; however, later on, under Sir Gerald Templer’s advice, the 
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Chinese population loyal to the Malayan government were integrated into the home 
defense program, as well as employed as Chinese translators.  Despite the subsequent 
economic compensation of the affected communities, the lack of consideration on the 
dietary habits of the indigenous tribes which were relocated from the jungle into the new 
resettle areas also produced dramatic consequences for the Indian population. 
In the case of Vietnamese and the Salvadorian governments this problems did not 
exist. In both countries the governments were mainly dealing with their own people. To a 
great extent race, ethnic composition, and language in each of these countries were very 
homogenous. Nevertheless, in the case of Vietnam, the advantage of having a culturally 
and linguistically homogeneous population was diminished by the religious differences 
between the Diem government (Catholic) and a great number of Buddhists in South 
Vietnam. Furthermore, the discriminatory practices promoted by the Diem government 
against the Buddhists population had a strong negative effect on the counterinsurgency 
effort and limited even more the capacity of the Saigon government to organize the civil 
defense organizations on rural areas. 
In Peru, at the beginning of the struggle, the culture and traditions of the 
indigenous inhabitants of the mountains and jungle, presented a series of obstacles to 
properly organize local defense organization. The armed forces sent by the Peruvian 
government to suffocate the insurgency in the mountains of Ayacucho became trapped in 
a region where they lacked the proper knowledge of the language and the cultural 
traditions of the indigenous society. The lack of knowledge of the indigenous Quechua 
language, and the difficulty in understanding the peasants’ customs and traditions, 
strongly increased repression by the armed forces. As stated by Palmer (1992), “Given 
the regional ethnic and linguistic differences…It is possible that many of the human 
rights violations which have occurred stemmed from the military’s lack of knowledge 
and understanding of local situations” (p.25). In the following years, the earlier 
experience of the rural populations with the government and their consequent distrust of 
the armed forces and police inhibited them, the rural population, from supporting the 
government’s cause. 
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The lack of knowledge of the local grievances and rivalry between communities 
also had a negative effect at the beginning of the program. Cases related to abuse 
practices and assassinations perpetrated by armed militias in neighboring villages where 
reported during the struggle (Comision de la Verdad y Reconciliacion, 2003). The 
government’s response, which finally proved to be effective, was to combine the local 
defense programs in rural communities with civic action programs and psychological 
operations; however, the creation of trustful local defenses took several years to 
consolidate. 
The culture and traditions variable cannot be overlooked when organizing local 
defenses. The first approach of the government to implement these programs will require 
an early planning, a complete knowledge of the cultural values and traditions in the 
region, and sensitivity. The armed forces and police, in order to organize the rural areas 
with local defense organizations will first need to establish a close and trustful relation 
with the rural population; a complete knowledge of their customs and beliefs will help on 
this endeavor. In this case it must be noted that an erroneous approach to the community 
will indicate a weakness in the relationship between the government and the rural. The 
insurgents will be observing in order to capitalize on the mistakes of the government. As 
bad news travels fast, an erroneous approach by the government will easily spread over 
other communities creating a negative image of the local defense program. 
 
D. COUNTERINSURGENCY STRATEGY 
When planning the implementation of local defense organizations, it is not 
enough to consider this program as part of the counterinsurgency strategy. As noted by 
analyzing the implementation of local defense organizations in Malaya, Vietnam, El 
Salvador, and Peru, the local defense program can only be effective and contribute to the 
overall counterinsurgency effort if it is encompassed and integrated with the other 
programs considered in the strategy. 
In Malaya and Peru, despite the early difficulty of both governments to shape a 
coherent and comprehensive counterinsurgency strategy, and despite the initial failure in 
organizing the local defense programs, both governments were able to build-up effective 
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local defense organizations in the rural areas. The initial coercive methods and isolated 
efforts applied by both governments in trying to gain the support of the population were 
replaced by a consistent mix of military as well as non-military programs such as civic 
actions, psychological operations, and selective military operations. Establishing security 
in the rural communities and strategic hamlets through the use of local defense units was 
considered the backbone of the strategy to regain popular support. As stated by the 
Peruvian Truth Commission (2003), “thru the years, the Rondas Campesinas have 
converted into fearful opponents of the SL…The defeat of the SL starts when the 
peasants lost fear for the SL’s violent actions and began to organize in local defenses” (p. 
450). The effectiveness and continuance of all the other programs depended on the 
security provided by the local defenses. At the same time, the effectiveness and 
continuance of the local defense organizations also depended on the support and coherent 
application of all other programs, creating an interdependent relationship between them. 
The cases of Vietnam and El Salvador were somehow different. In both countries, 
despite permanent and isolated efforts of some advisors, politics, and military officials on 
the field who visualized the insurgent problem in its real magnitude, including the 
necessity of reestablishing the control over the population and of wining the war of ideas, 
the “big unit” mentality and miscalculation on the enemy’s approach prevailed up to the 
turning point when the guerrillas had established a solid base of supporters among the 
rural population and controlled great portions of the country. With some notable 
exceptions in both countries, at this point, any effort to establish a local defense 
organization proved to be temporary, and in most cases worthless. In Vietnam and El 
Salvador, the conflicting character of some programs – such as the bombing campaigns 
over civilian populations with the implementation of civil defense programs in these 
same locations - and the lack of implementation of other complementary measures, made 
the local defense programs fail in winning the hearts and mind of the population. 
Considering that the aim of the insurgents is to win the support of the population 
in order to overthrow the existing government; the local defense organizations constitute 
an invaluable tool for the government to physically and politically isolate the insurgents 
from the population. Nevertheless, these community organizations cannot subsist and be 
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effective by themselves; they will need complementary and mutually reinforcing 
programs, united under a coherent and clearly articulated counterinsurgency strategy. 
 
E. ECONOMIC RESOURCES 
As well as geography, timing, culture and traditions, and the counterinsurgency 
strategy, economic resources are an important consideration when implementing local 
defense organizations as part of the counterinsurgency effort. The availability of 
economic assets will affect the training, maintenance, reinforcement, equipment, and 
demobilization of the local defense units, as well as the accomplishment of 
complementary and subsidiary measures necessary for the sustainability of the local 
defense program. However the attainability of economic asset does not assure the success 
of the local defense program - as was proven in Vietnam and El Salvador. Economic 
resources will increase the possibilities of success for the state. This is not to say that the 
lack of economic resources will lead to failure. Malaya and Peru are two countries in 
which the economic limitations were effectively overcome with innovative ideas, which 
finally succeeded in supporting the local defense organizations on the rural areas. 
However, major economic resources properly managed and directed accordingly to the 
local defense programs could have reduced the conflict in cost, lives, and time. 
Economy became an important limitation in the build-up phase of the local 
defense organizations in Peru. At this point, the limited resources to train, equip, and arm 
the local defenses, as well as the lack of means to assist and reinforce the local defense 
units when attacked by the terrorists, had a contrary effect on the population. Under these 
conditions, some local defense members shifted to the side of the insurgents, while others 
established alliances with drug trafficking organizations. 
Despite the importance to innovate and avoid an exclusive reliance on economic 
assets - which at the same time normally brings to bear unnecessary technology for the 
kind of war that is being fought - the attainability of economic resources becomes 
important when organizing, equipping, training, assisting and demobilizing local defense 
organizations.  In cases like Vietnam and El Salvador where economic assets were 
abundant, the problem was not the lack of resources, but the allocation of them. In 
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Vietnam there was no US interest in allocating money toward the pacification effort. All 
the economic assets were directed to the “big unit” war. El Salvador proved a similar 
trend. In this case, in comparison to the money allocated in the air campaign and in 
conventional forces operations, the local defense program was taken out of the formula to 
defeat the MCP. Furthermore, according to Bacevich (1988), the United States did not 
make a concerted effort to persuade the Salvadorian armed forces to treat the civil 
defense seriously. In both cases, the problem was not the lack of economic resources, but 
the lack of government commitment, which will be discussed in the following section. 
 
F. GOVERNMENT COMMITMENT 
No counterinsurgency program will work if the government is not completely 
committed to wage the kind of war according to the enemy at hand. A government can 
prove its capability to overcome the geographic limitations, to attend the economic 
requirements, to perceive the early warnings of an incoming insurgency, to build-up a 
coherent counterinsurgency strategy, and to learn from the cultural values and believes of 
its target audience; however, if there is no clear policy, politic decision, and a strong 
commitment by decision makers at all levels, half of the battle will be lost. In 
counterinsurgency, particularly in the implementation of the local defense program, the 
lack of government commitment and risk aversion will do more harm than good. The 
incomplete implementation of a local defense program, as well as the partial compromise 
of the government to assist and reinforce local defense organizations, will only provide 
the insurgents with new armed and trained cadres, as well as with an important 
intelligence network. 
In Malaya, for instance, the lack of compromise of the government during the first 
two years of the struggle, gave the MCP enough room for maneuver to build-up its 
guerrilla front and to organize its support bases by taking advantage of the isolated 
Chinese Squatters. The situation in Peru had a similar trend; only that this time the 
Peruvian government took 10 years, after the first open action of the Shining Path, to 
show its commitment in confronting the insurgent organizations in both the military and 
non-military arenas.  In 1991, the local defense program was the most popular program of 
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the new administration to reestablish control over the rural areas, as well as to diminish 
the influence and attacks of the insurgents over the rural population. However, it must be 
noted, that by the time the government finally decides to support pacification programs in 
the rural areas, including the reinforcement of the concept and strength of the local 
defenses, the SL had entered the phase of Strategic Equilibrium. At that point, the 
subsistence of the local defenses program in these areas required an extra effort of the 
state to be implemented. 
In Vietnam, despite the initial misperception on the enemy’s approach, the 
erroneous relegation of the task of pacification to the South Vietnamese government, and 
the subsequent and understandable conventional response of the US, by 1966 there were 
important counterinsurgency experts - such as Sir Robert Thompson, the CIA, and 
Marine Major General Victor H. Krulak, between others – urging Washington to adopt 
unconventional tactics from the “Small Wars Manual” (NAVMC 2890, 1940), as to 
isolate the guerrillas from their base of support among the rural population. The key to 
wining the war, as it was stated by Krulak on a memo to Washington, was to provide 
security for the villagers by training the local people to defend themselves (Boot, 2002, 
pp. 293 -298). At that time, there was a clear understanding that an exclusive military 
approach was worthless, that the casualties to the guerrillas could be easily replaced from 
the rural population, and that the US was losing the war with a conventional approach; 
however, there was no intention of the US-South Vietnamese government to commit time 
and resources on “the other war”. There was no conviction on the effectiveness of the 
program to regain the support of the population and to extend government control on the 
rural areas. Despite isolated efforts to organize local defense organizations – like in the 
Buon Enao experiment - without the commitment of key personnel at the decision 
making level the program failed. 
The organization of civil defenses in El Salvador also lacked politic commitment. 
However, in this case, the decision making process was strongly influenced by the 
memories of the Organizacion Democratica Nacionalista (ORDEN) - a village-based 
paramilitary organization dating back to the early 1960, which was involved in 
extortions, violations to human rights, and intimidation of the population (Bacevich, 
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1998, p. 40). Furthermore, the fear of the Salvadoran decision makers of being involved 
in new scandals and the concern of Salvadoran military for a reduction of US economic 
aid were responsible for the limited resources invested in the civil defense program. 
In general, the government’s commitment to organize local defense organizations 
in rural areas has always been restricted by a number of factors. In all cases, there have 
been personal and collective interests limiting the organization of local defenses and a 
strong concern about the local defenses becoming guerrilla sympathizers and turning 
against the government which provided them with weapons. The lack of knowledge of 
decision makers about previous experiences in countering insurgencies, as well as the 
conviction - for political reasons - on a short term response to a long term problem, has 
also limited the capacity of the state to properly confront the enemy at hand. Another 
concern has been that of the politicians and military leaders, which have been worried 
about the vulnerability of the local defenses, as an easy source of weapons for the 
insurgents. Overall, there was no real commitment – at least for some time with Peru and 
Malaya – to assume responsibility of the local defense program; for it must be noted that 








VII.  CONCLUSION 
In guerrilla warfare, both the government and the insurgents are in a struggle to 
gain the support of the population within this struggle. There is not necessarily or 
exclusively a need for the physical attachment of the population, but there is a need for 
their political attachment. For the insurgents, the provision of food, shelter, and 
information are even more valuable than the physical involvement. “The successful 
commitment of the population to one side or the other, especially in the rural areas, will 
be of vital importance to the resolution of the struggle” (Osborne, 1965, p. 2). The 
support and protection of the rural populations must be the main objective of the 
government to isolate the guerrillas and to weaken theirs strength. 
From the cases selected, the use of local defense units as a means to protect the 
population from the insurgent’s influence and attacks, to extend the intelligence network 
among the rural population, and to extend government control over the rural areas proved 
to be an effective measure - - at least during the time period in which they where properly 
implemented - - to isolate the insurgents from their popular base of support. Despite the 
permanent lack of governmental commitment to support the local defense programs in 
countries like Vietnam and El Salvador, the program demonstrated its effectiveness on a 
small scale basis. 
A different mix of factors influencing the strategic and tactical levels - - both 
greatly interdependent - - such as Geography, Timing, Culture and Traditions, as well as 
the Counterinsurgency Strategy applied, the Economic Resources available, and the 
Government’s Commitment affected the implementation and development of the local 
defenses in each of the four cases presented. Although, the lack of knowledge of the 
Culture and Traditions of the local population, as well as a partial commitment of the 
state confronting the insurgents, were the most influential elements determining the 
effectiveness of the program. 
While limitations in all other factors can be overcome by the state and its allies, 
an overlook of the values and beliefs, the local customs, the ethnic problems, the local 
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grievances between neighboring communities, and the image of the state from the eyes of 
the population, have to be closely analyzed when planning the implementation of armed 
local defense organizations. The culture and traditions, language, and any other unique 
aspect considered influential in dealing with the local population when confronting an 
insurgency will require and in depth study at the first sign of a subversive phase. 
Initiating the battle without proper knowledge of the enemy and the local population at 
hand will only extend the conflict in time, money, and lives. 
A complete commitment of the government when implementing local defense 
organizations is instrumental. The state has to be convinced of the effectiveness of the 
program without expecting a quick solution for a long term problem. Furthermore, the 
program has to be implemented in the entire country and must enjoy the major support of 
the governmental officials and policymakers. “The greater security provided by 
organized and armed communities should begin in the safer area and spread outward to 
the less secure area like ink on a blotter” (Colby, 1989, p. 91).  The partial commitment 
of the government, and a focalized implementation for the local defense organizations, 
will only provide new armed cadres for the guerrillas and safe heavens for the insurgents 
to hide, organize, and recruit. Under this same token, a complete commitment will 
require sufficient economic assets to train, arm and equip, maintain, support, assist, and 
properly demobilize local defense organizations after the conflict. Off course innovation 
will be important in order to avoid exclusive reliance on economic assets; nevertheless, 
money and resources to support the program will be required. 
The Economic assets should not only be considered as to directly support the 
local defense program, but they will need to be acquired in order to develop 
complementary programs - - such as developmental programs, medical programs, civic 
action programs, crop counseling, and psychological operations programs. The 
government must create the mindset that the local defense program, far from being an 
isolated effort, is part of the package to support the population. Encompassing and 
integrating all these programs with the military campaign, under a coherent and early 
counterinsurgency strategy, will be critical to gradually defeat the insurgents. For the 
government, and particularly for the military, the mindset must be that this war is not a 
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war to militarily defeat the insurgents, but to a great extend, to regain the support of the 
population; by accomplishing the latter, the insurgents will be defeated. 
Differing from the way conventional conflicts are handled, it must be noted that, 
at the tactical level, an erroneous approach of the government over the population in 
order to implement local defenses, will easily spread throughout the region and could 
have strategic consequences. The main challenges of the military units implementing the 
local defense programs will be to understand the local culture, to establish a reliable 
channel of communication with the local population, to implement an intelligence 
network within the villages, as well as to properly organize, train, equip, and assist the 
local defense units whenever needed. However, one of the most demanding challenges 
will be to permanently maintain contact with the local population. A way to accomplish 
this goal will be to avoid reliance on air mobility for maintenance visits and the strategic 
location of military bases on rural areas. 
Taking into account the past experiences of the cases presented, a 
reference to assist the tactical commander to implement local defenses at the 
tactical level, is provided in the final section of this thesis. The military order 
annex is a quick reference or guide if one is required to complete an operations 
order, annex or fragmentary order for planning a local defense operation. The 
annex only highlight in general terms the key variables needed to be address at 
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APPENDIX 
This Annex is a quick reference or guide if one is required to complete an 
operations order, annex or fragmentary order for planning a local defense operation. This 
annex will only highlight in general terms the key variables needed to be address at the 
tactical level and war-gamed in mission analysis. The format will be as per Field Manuel 
101-5, Headquarters, Department of the Army, Washington, DC, 31 May 1997. 
 
OPERATION ORDER- Number (Name) 
References:  
Time Zone Used Throughout the Order: (Local) 
Task Organization:  When assigning military or police units, it is critical to assign units 
that have the capability to work in remote areas with little logistical support. Specialty 
units need to be attached in support of the program. These units are Civil Affairs, 
Psychological operations and medical assets. In addition translators or interpreters and 
guides must be assigned to the units. 
1. Weather and Light Data and General Forecast: 
High   Moonrise    Sunrise 
Low   Moonset    Sunset   
Wind Speed  Moon phase    BMNT   
Wind Direction % Illumination   EENT   
 
 
2. Terrain: In addition to the terrain analysis, one should keep in mind that the 
insurgents would always try to take advantage of the terrain conditions. The variable of 
terrain and geography limits the state to exercise control over remote populations. The 
state will have to overcome the barriers imposed by the terrain accessibility limitations. 
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1.  SITUATION 
Enemy Forces: Intelligence on strength and locations of insurgent or guerrilla 
units are difficult to determine, especially in the phase of subversion and the guerrilla 
phase of the insurgency. The situation on the enemy forces should consider the remote 
local populations and their composition to determine the potential resources the 
insurgents or guerilla forces can gather from the population, which is critical for the 
insurgents’ growth and survivability.   The insurgent’s freedom of movement is 
determined by the insurgent’s ability to grow in strength and legitimacy where the state 
has little or no control. 
(1) Composition, disposition, strength:  When determining the size and strength 
of an insurgency, the ability of the insurgents to recruit from local populations would 
determine the growth rate of the insurgency. Little time and training is necessary to 
recruit the local population to rapidly increase the size of an insurgent force. The 
insurgents to recruit their new cadres from the local population will apply persuasive and 
then coercive methods. The insurgency will grow from nothing to a strength position 
were it can challenge the government. 
 (2) Recent activities:  Initially the insurgents are determined to grow in size and 
legitimacy. The insurgents will not confront the state in direct action unless the insurgents 
are confronted. The actions of ambushes, bombings, and selective targeting are what the 
insurgents desire to employ to attrit the state’s forces and increase their legitimacy with 
the population. When analyzing the recent events, what is not known is critical. Every 
action the insurgents accomplish is desired to generate more resources, legitimacy, or 
manpower from the population. 
(3) Known/suspected locations and capabilities:  The insurgent’s lifelines in 
remote regions are the resources the local populations can provide, or what the insurgents 
can take. The insurgents will stage in either the countryside or very remote areas and 
establish a relationship with the local population in which they can blend in and operate. 
The resources capability of the local populations can determine the locations of the 
guerrilla influence or locations. Border regions with other countries or regions can be, 
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especially in isolated undermanned borders, a favorable location for staging and resource 
channels to the guerrillas. 
(4) Describe the enemy's most likely and most dangerous course of action: 
The insurgent’s main concern is to initially grow in strength and resources to enlarge its 
organizations. At first the insurgency will develop in the subversive phase. In this phase it 
will be difficult for the state to identify their location and composition. The second phase 
is the guerrilla phase. The most likely course of action during the guerrilla phase is 
fanatic-like operations and terrorist attacks mainly on government forces, state authority 
facilities, and local supporters of the state.   The insurgents will conduct ambushes and 
bombing on known state forces locations in order to capture equipment and weapons and 
increase their legitimacy with the population.  The third phase will commence when the 
insurgents have grown and organized in numbers and resources to mount conventional 
operations. The insurgents will not mount a large direct action against the state unless it 
has mustered enough combat forces and has the logistical base to mass overwhelming 
force over the state and confront the forces in conventional combat operations. 
 
Friendly forces: In addition to identifying the mission of units that will be 
operating in the adjacent areas of the local defense operation, the strength and weakness 
of the local population should be addressed. The potential strength of the local 
population, referring to population locations and the numbers of men that can participate, 
will determine the possible course of actions relative to the establishment of a local 
defense program. The social and customary organization within the region will differ 
some from area to area and village to village. Every local population from the hamlet to 
the village has an existing internal social organization with hierarchies and rules. The 
ability to identify those social controls or structures will be the rudimentary base for the 
local defense organization.  In addition, the livelihood the local population depends on 
from agriculture, livestock, mining etc. will determine the amount of labor and manpower 
which is needed by the local population to be dedicated in producing the basic amount of 
substance for the local population and the amount of labor, manpower, which can be 
dedicated to the local defense program. The customs, traditions, and language must be 
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analyzed and understood. This is a variable that the insurgents exploit in favor for 
acquiring support from the local population towards their cause. In understanding, 
respecting, and accepting the customs, traditions and language of the local population 
will enhance and transition the support of the local population to the state. 
 
2. MISSION 
The mission of the ground commander is to establish and maintain local defense 
units in order to extend government control in isolated areas or regions, by negating the 




1. Concept of the Operations. The following should be considered when writing 
the concept of the operation. 
• Address the goal of denying the enemy the ability to recruit and hinder the 
enemy’s to move freely with in the region. 
• To deny the insurgent force the resources of the local population and hinder 
the organization’s ability to grow. 
• Local defense operations should take into consideration the ability of the 
state’s units to capitalize on the local social structures of the local population 
and develop and organize the population with existing social structures and 
controls into a system or organization to defend the villages or hamlets with 
the assistance of the state. 
• Maintaining local population support by conducting humanitarian operations 
and civic actions, while establishing a governmental infrastructure and system 
to help alleviate the strain the population will incur when drawing on local 
resources to the local defense program and establishing governmental control. 
• Psychological operations themes and messages should reinforce the “state’s” 
legitimacy and goals. 
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Local defense programs or operations have several stages or phases depending on 
the region or conflict. The four stages listed below should be considered when planning 
and developing a local defense program. 
 
Phase one- Assessment- 
• An in-depth assessment should be conducted on the geography and political-
military aspects of the region. 
• This assessment should take into consideration the ability of the state to 
rapidly reinforce a local defense if confronted with an overwhelming guerilla 
force. Reinforcement by air should be the least preferred because air might not 
be available due to maintenance, weather, or lack of resources. 
• A security study in each village must be conducted to determine the internal 
and external strengths and weaknesses of the location and the local 
population. 
• The state needs to identify what assets and routes are available to reinforce 
each local defense in a time of crisis or attack. 
• The distance from communities organized with local defense units to a 
military support base must be calculated according to terrain and the 
capability to establish maintenance operations either by foot or vehicles. 
• The ability to reinforce the local defense will determine the type of weapons 
and amount of class V the local defense will be issued. On the type of 
weapon, it must be considered that every armed person is a potential insurgent 
recruit or a source of arms if the insurgents can kill or capture the villager. 
• A determination must be made of the locations of state forces in the region: 
The two missions the units will perform should determine the strategic 
locations of the state’s units in the region. The first is reinforcement or quick 
reactionary forces, the second, and most important, is maintaining support and 
governmental control through out the area the state forces will operate in. 
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• The routes of the reinforcement and maintenance operations will differ since 
the reinforcement mission will be a more direct route, which must be 
calculated, and the maintenance mission can be longer but must be connected 
to every population center in the area. In both cases, military units must not 
fall on routine. 
• Determine what kind of communication system will be used or needed for 
communicating with local defenses by the state units. 
• Identifying the local social structure in the region in order enhance the local 
defenses’ chain of command by utilizing the existing local hierarchy social 
structures. 
 
Phase two- Training and Arming: Local defenses are a defensive operation and 
should not be used as an offensive tool. Their main intent is to establish and maintain 
government control through out a region. 
• The amount and type of weapons will depend on the area to cover, strength of 
the guerrillas, terrain, and capabilities of the local population. 
• Local defenses must be sufficiently armed as to defend their villages, but not 
as much as to constitute a potential threat for the state in the future. 
• The training of the local defense force should be conducted in an isolated area 
of the village. 
• The training should coincide with the growth of the local defense program in 
the region. Once the state has identified the area or region where the local 
defense will be established, the nearest village closest to the state’s base will 
receive the equipment and training first. Then gradually the state will train the 
next farther local defense in either a circular or star method. 
• Villagers will be issued a photo identification card in order to identify who 
has been trained, to determine if the insurgents have recruited a villager; and 
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to pay any salary or benefits to the villagers if wounded or killed, such 
payment is a benefit of the program. 
• The establishment of the local defense’s leadership should be identified and 
given the assets and training to control its defense. 
Phase three- Contact and maintain: During this phase the ability of the state to 
maintain governmental control through out the region and mass forces when insurgent 
forces engage the local defenses is critical. 
• Continuous contact of the military and the local population must be constant 
and reinforcing. Prevent the “bunker mentality” of staying with in the military 
compound. 
• Conduct Civil Action operations to include humanitarian projects in order 
portray to the local population that the state is committed to the populations’ 
needs in order to support governmental control and legitimacy in the region. 
• Establish an intelligence network through out the region by utilizing the local 
defense to collect intelligences in order to identify insurgent activities. 
• Even thought each local defense is defensive in nature, it should conduct 
limited patrols from its village. Each village will be responsible for a certain 
area around its village and each village should be interlocked so the entire 
region has local defenders patrolling routinely within the entire region. 
• Payments and benefits for local defense members must be publicized; any 
compensation for deaths or injuries must be completed timely. 
• A technique to measure or gauge the level of security in a particular area is the 
observation of the percentage of children attending schools (HA projects) or 
children playing in the local playgrounds in close vicinity to government 
facilities. The amount of the local children population attending school or 
playing in the playgrounds can be indicative of the local population sense of 
the security level in the area. 
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• The ability to identify and gauge the amount of children that are potential 
recruits for the insurgents is to identify if there is an influx of student 
attendance in schools to see if there is an increase in insurgent recruiting. 
Phase four- Demobilization: During this phase the state will withdraw its forces 
from the area and turn over the region to the state civil authority. The local population 
might feel that they are capable of governing themselves and need to be involved in, if 
not solely part of, the state’s civil authority that will be established in the region. 
• Conduct a recognition ceremony for the members of the local defenders where 
they would receive benefits and payments and where they will turn in their 
weapons and ammunition. In addition the ceremony would officially transfer 
authority from the local defenders to the new state’s civil authority. 
• The issue of recollecting the arms and equipment needs to be considered. If 
there is a plan to recollect the arms, then the villagers might feel betrayed and 
might feel vulnerable to reprisal from any potential insurgents in the regions. 
• New Identification cards need to be issued throughout the region from a local 
defender ID card to a state civil authority ID card. 
• State civil authority needs to take in to account local customs of the region to 
maintain authority and justice in the region and to continue with the 
humanitarian and construction programs started by the military. 
 
4.  SERVICE SUPPORT. 
 
• It is critical to logistically support the state units in remote areas.  This can be 
mitigated if the units are provided with operational funds in which they can 
purchase supplies and necessities from the local population. An attempt to 
purchase or acquire many supplies from the local population would enhance 
the mission success and enhance local population support for the state. 
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• The commercial communication system that is identified in the assessment 
stage needs to be acquired or purchased and a dedicated frequency needs to be 
established. Encrypted radios are not recommended. 
• The weapons, class V (ammunition) and equipment that will be issued to the 
local population should be established before the state forces arrive in the 
region or early in the assessment stage. Depending on the terrain, shotguns 
could be used as a standard weapon of the local defenders. Long-range rifles 
are not recommended due to the possible confrontation between the state and 
local defense forces when it comes time to demobilize the local defenses. 
• Early alarms and booby traps may be considered in the surrounding areas of a 
village. 
• The state must plan for and establish additional stocks of ammunition to re-
supply and train both the local defenses and the state forces. 
• The state forces must be able to produce a unique identification card in the 
field and have a database to track and issue the ID cards. Every person in the 
region must be issued an ID card in order for the state to identify any new 
person in the region and to statically identify the composition of the local 
population. 
 
5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL 
 
• The command of each local defense organization should be established 
according to local customs without undermining their traditions.  The use of 
the local leadership will enhance the capability and provide some legitimacy 
to the organization to the local population. 
• The leader of each local defense needs to understand his requirements and 
mission and be responsive to the state units and chain of command. The 
leaders of the local defense forces will be held accountable for all actions of 
his local defense forces. 
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• The functions and standards of conduct of the members of the local defense 
must be clearly established. 
• A security/defense plan must be implemented within each village to organize 
drills, alarms, evacuations, crisis management, emergency communications, 
rehearsals, training, security zones, and functions and responsibilities of the 
inhabitants in general; and the local defenses in particular. 
• There must be a clear chain of command established from each local defense 
to the military forces, to include a clear chain of command within the state 
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